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CENTURY: CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN
PRACTICE AND KNOWLEDGE BY INTRODUCING
EXPERTISE INTO SENTENCING LAW
Mirko Bagaric*
Nick Fischer**
Gabrielle Wolf **

I.

INTRODUCTION

Sentencing law is the area of law where the state acts in its most
coercive and authoritative manner against its citizens. It is fundamentally
broken. There is no tenable rationale that can justify the shocking reality
that there are currently more than two million Americans in prisons and
local jails.' The rate of incarceration in the United States is the highest
on earth and by a considerable margin, even when compared to other
developed countries, most of which imprison their citizens at more than
four times the world average.2 It is apparent from a consideration of
* Professor and Director of the Evidence-Based Sentencing and Criminal Justice Project,
Swinbume University, Melbourne.
** Adjunct Research Fellow, Monash University, Melbourne.
Lecturer, Deakin University, Melbourne.
*
1. It is widely accepted that the United States has a "serious over-punishment" and "mass
incarceration" problem. See ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING
COMMUNITIES: REENTRY, RACE, AND POLITICS 9-15 (2008); Lynn Adelman, What the Sentencing
Commission Ought to Be Doing: Reducing Mass Incarceration,18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295, 295-96,

307-08 (2013); David Cole, Turning the Corneron Mass Incarceration?,9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27,
28-33 (2011); Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE:
AMERICA'S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 96, 96-105 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012);

Bernard E. Harcourt, Keynote: The Crisis and CriminalJustice, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 970-78
(2012); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of Mass
Incarceration,9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133, 153-64 (2011); Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarcerationat

Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 426-36 (2013).
2. WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, ExEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23 (2016),

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/CEA%2BCriminal%2
BJustice%2BReport.pdf.
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imprisonment and severity-weighted crime rates' that between 1983 and
2013 the United States became 165% more punitive.4
The most pressing and important issue relating to sentencing law
and practice is its continued disregard of expert knowledge and
empirical evidence. Sentencing is the area of law where there is the
greatest gap between practice and what knowledge tells us can be
achieved.' All other social institutions and areas of learning, such as
medicine, engineering, and education, readily embrace and change their
practices in response to new learning that demonstrates more efficient
and effective ways of achieving desirable outcomes. In sentencing,
however, the dominant practices and reforms made in the last four
decades, which are responsible for the mass incarceration crisis, have
been implemented despite voluminous, largely academic, literature
exposing their problems.6 Empirical evidence highlights that key
sentencing objectives that have been invoked to justify heavier penalties,
such as marginal general deterrence and specific deterrence, are flawed,
yet they remain central goals of American sentencing systems.
In this Article, we examine the reasons for the gulf between
sentencing knowledge and practice, and make recommendations
regarding the measures that need to be undertaken to bridge that gap, so
that lawmakers bring sentencing practice in line with current knowledge

3. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., THE PUNISHMENT RATE: NEW METRIC EVALUATES PRISON
USE RELATIVE TO REPORTED CRIME 2 (2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2016/03/
thepunishmentrate.pdf ("The severity-weighted crime rate captures the frequency and seriousness

of reported crime per 100,000 residents, as measured by the seven specific offenses for which
reliable, national data are available and that the FBI classifies as Part I offenses: criminal homicide,
rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, theft, and motor vehicle theft.").
4. Id.

5.

See infra Part IV.

6. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: EXPLORING THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 116-17, 121-22 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds.,
2014); MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 134 (1996); Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The

Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 89-95 (2005);
Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 37 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37,
40-54 (2006); Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth

Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 627-34 (2005)

&

[hereinafter Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences]; Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory
and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST. 363, 415-22 (1997) [hereinafter Frase, Sentencing Principles in
Practice]; Cassia Spohn, Twentieth-Century Sentencing Reform Movement, 13 CRIMINOLOGY

PUB. POL'Y 535, 536-39 (2014). See generally Michael Tonry, Crime and Human Rights-How
Political Paranoia, Protestant Fundamentalism, and Constitutional Obsolescence Combined to
Devastate Black America: The American Society of Criminology 2007 PresidentialAddress, 46

CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2008) [hereinafter Tonry, Crime and Human Rights]; Michael Tonry, Remodeling
American Sentencing: A Ten-Step Blueprintfor Moving Past Mass Incarceration, 13 CRIMINOLOGY

& PUB. POL'Y 503 (2014) [hereinafter Tonry, Remodeling American Sentencing].
7.

See infra Part IV.
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in this area and make it fairer and more efficient.' This is a greatly
under-researched area of law and policy, and, if our proposals are
adopted, the incarceration rate will be substantially reduced, far less
taxpayer dollars will be spent on prisons, and the community is likely to
be safer.
We argue that a key reason for the mass incarceration crisis and,
ultimately, the separation between sentencing knowledge and practice, is
the historical preference in the United States for retributive justice.'
While criminologists have attributed this emphasis to the so-called
"tough on crime" rhetoric and policies that dominated criminal justice
policy in the 1960s,"o "tough on crime" policies are deeply rooted in
political, social, and economic traditions that were entrenched in
American society well before the 1960s and, in some cases, even the
1860s.11 The diverse sources of these attitudes are explored in greater
detail in Part VI of this Article.12 We maintain that, despite this
longstanding attraction to retributive justice and criminals' lack of
political capital, attitudes can change and it is possible for sentencing
practice to be reformed in response to expert knowledge.
Indeed, particularly in the past two years, concern about mass
incarceration in the United States has been growing and there has been
wide-ranging public discussion about the need for solutions. The issue
has moved from academic inquiry to mainstream attention. Indeed, in
July 2015, Barack Obama became the first sitting U.S. President to visit
a U.S. prison when he visited a medium-security prison in central
Oklahoma.13 Following the visit, "[t]he president called for lowering-if
not ending-mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent drug
offenses, restoring the voting rights of ex-felons, revisiting hiring
practices that require applicants to list criminal activity, and expanding
job training programs so inmates are better prepared to reintegrate into

&

8. This builds on previous work undertaken by one of us. See Mirko Bagaric, From
Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing: Reducing the Rate of Imprisonment and Crime While
Saving Billions of Taxpayer Dollars, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 349, 374-409 (2014); Mirko Bagaric
Sandeep Gopalan, Saving the United States from Lurching to Another Sentencing Crisis: Taking
ProportionalitySeriously and Implementing Fair FixedPenalties, 60 ST. Louis U. L.J. 169, 179-97
(2016); Mirko Bagaric et al., A Principled Strategy for Addressing the Incarceration Crisis:
Redefining Excessive Imprisonment as a Human Rights Abuse, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming
2017) (on file with authors).
9. See infra Part VI.A.
10. See infra Part VIA.
11. See infra Part VI.A.2.
12. See infra Part VI.A.
13. Sabrina Siddiqui, 'An Injustice System': Obama's Prison Tour Latest in Late-Term
Reform Agenda, GUARDIAN (July 17, 2015, 6:43 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/
jul/16/barack-obama-prison-tour-criminal-justice-race-reform.
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society."l 4 Former President Obama also mentioned the need for
sentencing reform in his 2015 State of the Union address."
In 2016, 30,000 people, including police officials, attorneys, and
prosecutors, signed a public letter to Democratic Party presidential
nominee Hillary Clinton and (now) President Donald J. Trump urging a
fundamental re-think of sentencing law with a view to reducing
incarceration numbers." The letter states as follows:
We want dangerous offenders off our streets, and behind bars.
We want to make sure the people in the communities we serve are
protected... . However, we also know that our burgeoning prison
population is creating a new public safety challenge . . . over-relying
on incarceration does not deter crime. As prison budgets have
continued to rise, funding for state and local law enforcement has
been slashed, negatively impacting innovative work in the field
including diversion programs . .. and smart policing tactics. With
finite prison space, we believe prison should be used for the most
dangerous offenders....
[We urge you to] support policy changes that appropriately
address the burgeoning prison population through thoughtful and
sensible measures that protect public safety. These include
modifications to sentencing laws that carefully filter out the truly
dangerous individuals who belong in prison and out of our
communities, while allowing lower level offenders a chance for
redemption through alternative punishments that are proven to reduce
recidivism and rehabilitate. Such measures allow law enforcement to
17
more effectively protect and serve our country.
The current focus on problems with the sentencing system provides
a window in which the community and lawmakers may be receptive
to evidence-based reforms to sentencing. To take advantage of this
opportunity, it is necessary to research systematically and understand the
existing barriers to implementing progressive reforms to the sentencing
system. In so doing, this Article will help surmount these obstacles and
fill an important gap in the literature relating to sentencing reform.

14. Id.
15. Inimai M. Chettiar & Abigail Finkelman, If You Blinked, You Missed When Obama Made
Criminal Justice Reform History, BRENNAN

CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.

brennancenter.org/analysis/if-you-blinked-you-missed-when-obama-made-criminal-justice-reformhistory.
16. Letter from David LaBahn, President, Assoc. of Prosecuting Att'ys et al., to Donald J.
Trump, Donald J. Trump for President & Sec'y Hillary Clinton, Hillary for Am. (July 13, 2016),
http://lawenforcementleaders.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Law-Enforcement-Letter.pdf.
17. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss3/5

4

Bagaric et al.: Bringing Sentencing into the 21st Century: Closing the Gap Betwee

2017]

BRINGING SENTENCING INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

789

In the next Part of this Article, we provide an overview of
American sentencing law and practice." This is followed in Part III by
an examination of key failings of the sentencing system.1 9 Part IV
demonstrates the existence of the gap between sentencing practice and
knowledge.2 0 In this Part, we provide an overview of the current state of
learning about objectives that can be achieved through a state-based
system of punishment. We demonstrate that the two primary sentencing
goals, which have resulted in increased prison numbers, are flawed.
Empirical data shows that the theory of (marginal) general deterrence21
is unsound, as harsher penalties do not deter individuals from
committing crimes. Incapacitation22 (as a means of community
protection) is also a misguided ideal for several reasons, including
because there are no accurate methods for predicting which serious
offenders are likely to reoffend. Specific deterrence, which is another,
though less invoked, sentencing objective, is also misconceived. It is
founded on the theory that harsh penalties will dissuade individual
offenders from reoffending to avoid again being subjected to criminal
punishment, but harsh penalties probably have the opposite effect and
increase recidivism.2 3 In this Part, we suggest that an evidence-based
sentencing system would almost halve prison numbers. This outcome
would be achieved by adopting a bifurcated system whereby prison
sentences are reserved mainly for serious violent and sexual offenders,
while more lenient sanctions are imposed on other offenders (such as
those who commit fraud, property, immigration, and drug offenses).24
18. See infra PartI.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. This is the theory that there is a link between harsh penalties and lower crime. See infra
Part IV.B.
22. This is often used interchangeably with the objective of community protection. See infra
Part IV.B.
23. See infra Part IV.A.
24. Approximately half of the offenders in U.S. state and federal prisons are not detained for
sexual or violent offenses. E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF

JUSTICE, NCJ 248955, PRISONERS IN 2014, at 11, 16 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
pl4.pdf. In 2013, there were 1,325,305 prisoners in U.S. state prisons. Id. at 30 tbl.4. The most
serious offense categories for these prisoners were as follows: violent 704,800; property 255,600;
drug 208,000; public order 146,300; and other 10,600. Id. There were 192,663 prisoners in U.S.
federal prisons as of September 2014. Id. at 30 tbl.5. Their most serious offenses were as follows:
violent 14,100; property 11,600; drug 96,500; public order 69,100; other 21,400. Id. Thus, less than
half of the total inmates (forty-seven percent) in federal and state prisons are imprisoned for sexual
and violent offenses. See id. at 30. In addition to this, there was an estimated 744,600 inmates in
local jails. Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, The Nation's Jails Held Fewer Inmates at
Midyear 2014 Compared to Their Peak Count in 2008 (June 11, 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/press/jiml4pr.cfm. This data, however, is not as accurate. See Data Collection: Annual Survey
ofJails, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfmn?ty-dcdetail&iid=261 (last visited Apr.
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The fact that lawmakers continue to pursue demonstrably unattainable
objectives indicates their unwillingness to allow sentencing policy
decisions to be guided by experts in the field, but also scholars' and
jurists' failure to promulgate their learning in an effective manner that
shapes critical social and legal policy.
Part V highlights the current mainstream focus on sentencing law
and appetite for fundamental reform of this area.25 It provides some basis
for confidence that lawmakers may finally be receptive to evidencebased suggestions regarding the development of sentencing law.
In Part VI, we discuss the reasons for the mass incarceration crisis,
which have led to the resistance of sentencing law and practice to expertbased reforms.2 6 We maintain that a major cause of the crisis is
retributive attitudes to criminal justice in the United States, which are
deeply entrenched in American politics, culture, and society, and have
manifested most recently in the embrace of "tough on crime" policies.
We demonstrate that such punitive attitudes have been generated and
fueled by racism, the crime wave from about 1960 to 1980, economic
instability over the past three decades, and the privatization of aspects of
criminal justice policy and practice. In this Part of the Article, we offer
solutions to overcome, or at least minimize, these barriers to expertbased sentencing reform.
We also argue that mass incarceration is attributable to a
considerable knowledge gap regarding a core component of the
principle.
proportionality
the
namely,
system,
sentencing
bulwark
as
a
endorsed
universally
is
Proportionality, at least in theory,
27 In its crudest form it is the intuitively appealing
of sentencing.
principle that the "punishment should fit the crime." 28 The principle is so
alluring that it is normally endorsed without qualification. However, it
suffers from a fundamental problem: it is devoid of clear criteria. While
there is near universal agreement that the seriousness of the punishment
should match the gravity of the crime, there is not even a remote
consensus regarding how these two limbs should be calibrated. The
principle is so nebulous that it can be used to justify a ten-month or a
ten-year prison term for a drug trafficker or an inside trader. A principle
that is so fluid is in fact no principle at all; it is a meaningless, abstract
10, 2017) ("Collects data from a nationally representative sample of local jails on jail inmate
populations, jail capacity, and related information. The collection began in 1982 and has been
conducted annually, except for years 1983, 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2005, during which a complete
census of U.S. local jails was conducted.").
25. See infra Part V.
26. See infra Part VI.
27. See infra Part VI.B.
28. See infra Part VI.B.
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aspiration. We contend that scholars' failure to formulate a coherent and
persuasive theory of proportionality has made it easy, and even
inevitable, for lawmakers to ignore sentencing knowledge in the design
and promulgation of sentencing law and policy. 29 In this Part of the
Article, we attempt to give content to the principle of proportionality.
Before proceeding to substantive matters, it is opportune to deal
with an ostensible paradox in this Article. A key argument of this Article
is that scholarly writing, essentially in the forms of academic articles and
books, has been largely ineffective in influencing sentencing reform.
Yet, in our view, it is still important to raise this for discussion in an
Article that will reach principally an academic audience because, in
order to remedy any problem, the first step is to identify and recognize
it, and this scholarly audience has the knowledge and resources to adjust
its methods so that it does influence the direction of sentencing law
and practice.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT SENTENCING SYSTEM

We commence our analysis by providing a brief overview of
the sentencing framework in the United States. All state and federal
jurisdictions have their own sentencing regimes. 30 Each system has
distinctive features, but there are considerable similarities in the
overarching objectives of sentencing throughout the United States.
The main objectives of sentencing are community protection (also
known as incapacitation),3 1 general deterrence,32 specific deterrence,3
rehabilitation,3 4 and retribution.3 5 While the objectives are relatively
uniform, they are not equal in weight, and community protection has
been the dominant aim of sentencing in the United States for the past
forty years. 6

29. See infra notes 402-09 and accompanying text.
30. Sentencing-and, more generally, criminal law-in the United States is mainly the
province of states. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612-13 (2000).
31. Incapacitation is the theory that imprisoning offenders or curtailing their freedom by other
means reduces the crime rate. See Bagaric,supra note 8, at 382-91.
32. General deterrence is the theory that there is a link between harsher penalties and lower
crime. See id. at 377.
33. Specific deterrence is the theory that harsh penalties discourage recidivism in offenders
who are subjected to these sanctions. See id. at 375.
34. Rehabilitation is the theory that crime can be reduced by treatment, which elicits positive
attitudinal reform in offenders. See id at 391.
35. Retribution is the theory that criminal offending should be met with a stem response. See
id. at 394-95. These objectives are set out in U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2015).
36. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supranote 6, at 7.
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The goal of community protection has been most pointedly pursued
through the enactment of prescriptive sentencing laws, which
significantly limit judicial discretion37 and often prescribe prison terms.
Fixed minimum or presumptive penalties 38 now apply (to varying
degrees) in all jurisdictions in the United States.39 Prescribed penalties
are often set out in sentencing grids, which normally use criminal history
scores 4 0 and offense seriousness to calculate appropriate penalties. These
grids are sometimes referred to as sentencing guidelines. 4 1 The penalties
prescribed by the guidelines have been criticized as being too harsh.
Typical of this sentiment is the following observation by Michael Tonry:
Anyone who works in or has over time observed the American
criminal justice system can repeat the litany of tough-on-crime
sentencing laws enacted in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s:
mandatory minimum sentence laws (all 50 states), three-strikes laws
(26 states), life-without-possibility-of-parole laws (49 states), and
truth-in-sentencing laws (28 states), in some places augmented
by "career criminal," "dangerous offender," and "sexual predator"
laws. These laws, because they required sentences of historically
37. See id at 3. As noted by William W. Berry III:
Prior to 1984, federal judges possessed discretion that was virtually "unfettered" in
determining sentences, guided only by broad sentence ranges provided by federal
criminal statutes. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the "Act") moved the sentencing
regime almost completely to the other extreme, implementing a system of mandatory
guidelines that severely limited the discretion of the sentencing judge.
William W. Berry III, Discretion Without Guidance: The Need to Give Meaning to § 3553 After
Booker and Its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REv. 631, 633 (2008).
38. For the purposes of clarity, these both come under the terminology of fixed or standard
penalties in this Article.
39. They are also one of the key distinguishing aspects of the United States' sentencing
system compared to that of Australia (and most other sentencing systems in the world). See CONNIE
DE LA VEGA ET AL., UNIV. OF S.F. SCH. OF LAW, CTR. FOR LAw & GLOB. JUSTICE, CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 46-47 (2012) (noting that 137 of
168 surveyed countries had some form of minimum penalties, but none were as wide-ranging or
severe as those in the United States). However, as noted below, not all jurisdictions have
comprehensive guideline systems.
40. This is based mainly on the number, seriousness, and age of the prior convictions. See,
e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A2.3.
41. See Richard S. Frase & Kelly Lyn Mitchell, What Are Sentencing Guidelines?,
UNIV. MINN. ROBINA INST. CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST., http://sentencing.umn.edu/content/what-aresentencing-guidelines (last visited Apr. 10, 2017) (defining sentencing guidelines as rules that "(1)
are currently in effect; (2) recommend sentences, for most types of crime or at least most felonies,
that are deemed to be appropriate in typical cases of that type (i.e., cases that do not present
aggravating or mitigating factors that might permit departure from the recommendation); (3) were
developed initially or later endorsed by a legislatively-created sentencing commission (regardless of
whether the rules are embodied in statutes, and even if the sentencing commission ceased to exist at
some point after the guidelines went into effect); and that (4) judges are legally required to consider
(even if the judge is then free to ignore the applicable recommendation), or that it appears judges are
considering even if they are not required to").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss3/5

8

Bagaric et al.: Bringing Sentencing into the 21st Century: Closing the Gap Betwee

2017]1

BRINGING SENTENCING INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

793

unprecedented lengths for broad categories of offenses and offenders,
are the primary causes of contemporary levels of imprisonment. 42
It has been contended that none of these policies, which have led to
the increase in fixed penalties, emanated from a clear theoretical
foundation, but rather stemmed from "back-of-an-envelope calculations
and collective intuitive judgements."43 In a similar vein, Douglas
Berman and Stephanos Bibas state that "[o]ver the last half-century,
sentencing has lurched from a lawless morass of hidden, unreviewable
discretion to a sometimes rigid and cumbersome collection of rules."4
As we discuss further in Part VI of this Article, this transition has
been caused, to a considerable degree, by the extensive involvement of
non-judicial bodies in determining the nature and length of sentences.45
These non-judicial bodies include legislatures, at both federal and
state levels, and state electorates themselves, which determine policy
directly through "proposition" ballots.4 6 In addition, the direct election of
judges and prosecutors (a distinguishing feature of the American
judicial system) has contributed markedly to the exceptional severity and
rigidity of sentencing in the United States. 47 Fear of electoral retribution
among assembly members (who face the verdict of the electorate far
more frequently and in more forms than legislators in most other
nations) and among judicial officers has encouraged the adoption of
a "tough on crime agenda" which has resulted in harsh and often
compounding sentences.4 8
As a consequence of these practices, more offenders have been
sentenced to prison and to longer terms of imprisonment.49 For example,
a 2012 report by the Pew Center on the States found that the average

&

42. Tonry, Remodeling American Sentencing, supra note 6, at 514 (citations omitted).
43. Michael Tonry, The QuestionableRelevance of Previous Convictions to Punishmentsfor
Later Crimes, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING 93 (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von
Hirsch eds., 2010); see Alschuler, supra note 6, at 92-95. For further criticism of the Guidelines, see
Berman & Bibas, supra note 6, at 40-54; and Judge James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just
Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L.
POL'Y REV. 173, 180-86 (2010).
44. Berman & Bibas, supranote 6, at 40.
45. See infra Part VI.A.5.
46. See infra Part VI.A.5.
47. See infra Part VL.A.5.
48. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supranote 6, at 123-24.
49. MICHAEL MITCHELL & MICHAEL LEACHMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
CHANGING PRIORITIES: STATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS AND INVESTMENTS IN EDUCATION

5-6 (2014), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/10-28-14sfp.pdf; see also PEW
CHARITABLE TRS., MORE PRISONERS, LESS PROBATION FOR FEDERAL OFFENDERS (2016), http://
www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2016/01/psppfs moreprisonlessprobation vl.pdf.
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length of prison sentences has increased thirty-six percent since 1990.so
A more recent report by the Sentencing Project notes that more than ten
percent of prisoners in U.S. prisons are serving a life sentence." This is
more than four times the rate in 1984 (despite crime rates declining
during this period).52 Further, the number of prisoners serving a life
sentence without the possibility of parole had increased by twenty-two
percent between 2008 and 2013.53
As discussed further below,5 4 some of the increases to the severity
of sanctions and the incarceration rate may have initially, at least partly,
responded to increased rates of crime, but there has been a marked
reduction in the crime rate in the last two decades. 5 It has been noted
that, in recent years, violent crime has decreased nationally "by a
standard measure of about forty percent," and "in New York City by as
much as eighty percent. By 2010, the crime rate in New York had
seen its greatest decline since the Second World War; in 2002, there
were fewer murders in Manhattan than there had been in any year
since 1900."56
The crime rate continues to diminish, contrary to assertions by
President Trump that America is becoming more dangerous.57 Further,
the most recent evidence regarding crime trends in states that have
increased or decreased incarceration levels debunks the view that more
prisoners leads to less crime. The Brennan Center for Justice, in its
recent report entitled Update: Changes in State Imprisonment Rates,
examined data from all fifty states on crime and imprisonment from
2006 to 2014." The key findings are as follows:

50. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, TIME SERVED: THE HIGH COST, Low RETURN OF
LONGER PRISON TERMS 13 tbl.1 (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/mediallegacy/uploadedfiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/sentencingandcorrections/prisontimeservedpdfpdf
51. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE SENTENCES IN
AMERICA 13 (2013),http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Life-Goes-On.pdf.
52. Id.
53. Id.

54. See infra Part IV.B.
55. The serious crime rate in the United States started dropping in the early 1990s. See
D'Vera Cohn et al., Gun Homicide Rate Down 49% Since 1993 Peak; Public Unaware, PEW
RES. CTR. (May 7, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/05/07/gun-homicide-rate-down-49-

since-1 993-peak-public-unaware.
56. Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America, NEW YORKER (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/the-caging-of-america.
57. See Gabriel Dance & Tom Meagher, Crime in Context. Violent Crime Is Up in Some
Places, but Is It Really a Trend?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 18, 2016, 2:20 PM), https://www.

themarshallproject.org/2016/08/18/crime-in-context#.2Qv1YI SZF.
58. See LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & JAMES CULLEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., UPDATE:
CHANGES IN STATE IMPRISONMENT RATES 1 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/
files/analysis/UpdateChangesinStatelmprisonment.pdf.
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Many argue that increased incarceration is necessary to reduce
crime. Yet the data shows the opposite. Over the last ten years,
27 states have decreased both crime and imprisonment. Not
only is this trend possible, it's played out in the majority of
states. Nationally, imprisonment and crime have fallen together,
7 percent and 23 percent respectively since 2006. Crime continued
its downward trend while incarceration also decreased.
In recent years, states in the South have seen some of the largest
decreases in imprisonment. Yet, they also remain the largest
incarcerators in the country. Mississippi reduced imprisonment by
10 percent but still has the nation's 5th highest incarceration rate.
Texas has reduced imprisonment by 15 percent yet still has the 7th
59
highest imprisonment rate in the country.

While 4ll American states have some form of prescribed penalties,
not all have wide-ranging guideline sentencing systems. The Robina
Institute notes that twenty U.S. jurisdictions currently have guideline
sentencing systems.60 The most extensively analyzed prescribed penalty
laws are found in the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual
("Guidelines").61 The Guidelines are important because of the large
number of offenders sentenced under the federal system and the
significant doctrinal influence they have exerted at the state level.62
The United States Sentencing Commission notes that the
Guidelines aim to "further the basic purposes of criminal punishment:
deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation." 63 The
Guidelines state that "the [Sentencing Reform] Act's basic objective was
to enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime
through an effective, fair sentencing system," 64 and "[m]ost observers of
the criminal law agree that the ultimate aim of the law itself, and of
punishment in particular, is the control of crime." 65 The principle of
59.

Id. (footnote omitted). But see Aamer Madhani, Chicago Hits Grim Milestone of 700

Murdersfor 2016 and the Year's Not over, USA TODAY (Dec. 1, 2016, 1:49 PM), http://www.

&

usatoday.com/story/news/2016/12/01/chicago-700-murders-2016/94732276 (reporting an increase
in the number of murders in Chicago in 2016).
60. The jurisdictions are as follows: Federal (U.S. courts), Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. Frase
Mitchell, supra note 41.
61.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2015).

62. See Berman & Bibas, supra note 6, at 40-42. There are more than 200,000 federal
prisoners. See CARSON, supra note 24, at 2 tbl.1. Also, the broad structure of the Guidelines is
similar to many other guideline systems in that the penalty range is not mandatory and permits
departures in certain circumstances. Frase & Mitchell, supra note 41.
63.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. I pt. A.

64. Id. at 2.
65. Id. at 4.
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proportionality is pursued in the Guidelines "through a system that
imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of
differing severity."6 ' The sentencing ranges were not developed in
abstract or against a purely theoretical model, but were influenced by an
analysis of over 40,000 sentences that had been imposed. 67
Like most grid sentencing systems, the key considerations that
determine the nature of a penalty under the Guidelines are the perceived
severity of the offense and the criminal history of the offender." Prior
convictions can have a considerable impact on penalty, and in some
cases lead to an approximate doubling of the sentence. For example, an
offense at level 1569 in the Guidelines carries a presumptive penalty for a
first offender of imprisonment for 18 to 24 months," which increases to
41 to 51 months for an offender with 13 or more criminal history
points.7 1 For an offense at level 35, a first offender has a guideline
penalty range of 168 to 210 months, which increases to 292 to 365
months for an offender with the highest criminal history score.7 2 Thus,
an extensive criminal history can add 155 months (more than 12 years)
to a jail term.7 1
Following the U.S. Supreme Court decision of United States v.
Booker,74 the Guidelines are no longer mandatory but advisory." While
66. Id. at 3.
67. See id. at 11 ("The Commission emphasizes that it drafted the initial guidelines with
considerable caution. It examined the many hundreds of criminal statutes in the UnitedStates Code.
It began with those that were the basis for a significant number of prosecutions and sought to place
them in a rational order. It developed additional distinctions relevant to the application of these
provisions and it applied sentencing ranges to each resulting category. In doing so, it relied on preguidelines sentencing practice as revealed by its own statistical analyses based on summary reports
of some 40,000 convictions, a sample of 10,000 augmented presentence reports, the parole
guidelines, and policy judgments.").
68. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U.
L. REv. 1109, 1113-16 (2008).
69.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5 pt. A. The offense levels range from 1

(least serious) to 43 (most serious). Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. The criminal history score ranges from zero to thirteen or more (worst offending
record). Id.

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In Booker, the Supreme Court held that aspects of the Guidelines
that were mandatory were contrary to the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. See id at 258; see
also Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 481 (2011) ("[W]hen a defendant's sentence has been
set aside on appeal, a district court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendant's
postsentencing rehabilitation [that may] support a downward variance from the now-advisory
Federal Sentencing Guidelines range."); Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 249-50 (2008);
Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 715 (2008) ("[T]here is no longer a limit comparable to the
one at issue in Burns on the variances from Guidelines ranges that a district court may find justified
under the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)."); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
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the Guidelines do remain an influential sentencing reference point,
courts are beginning to deviate from them. Until recently, sentences
within the Guidelines were still the norm. In 2014, however, for the
first time, federal courts imposed more sentences that were outside
the Guidelines than sentences that were within them. 77 The margin is

small (fifty-four to forty-six percent), but it does reflect a trend by the
judiciary to adhere to the Guidelines less closely than in the past.
While criminal history score and offense severity are cardinal
sentencing considerations, other matters also influence the penalty.
Courts can depart from a guideline for a number of reasons. The most
wide-ranging guideline is 18 U.S.C. § 3553, which states:
(a) Factors to be Considered in Imposing a Sentence-The court shall
impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to

comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this

41 (2007) ("[W]hile the extent of the difference between a particular sentence and the recommended
Guidelines range is surely relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentences-whether inside,
just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range-under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard."); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350-51 (2007) (holding that federal appellate court
may apply presumption of reasonableness to district court sentence that is within properly calculated
Guidelines range).
75. Consequently, district courts are required to properly calculate and consider the
Guidelines when sentencing, even in an advisory guideline system. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)-(5)
(2012); Gall, 552 U.S. at 48 ("As a matter of administration and to secure nationwide consistency,
the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark."); Rita, 551 U.S. at 351
(stating that a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the
applicable Guidelines range); Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 ("The district courts, while not bound to
apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.").
The district court, in determining the appropriate sentence in a particular case, therefore, must
consider the properly calculated Guidelines range, the grounds for departure provided in the policy
statements, and then the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Rita, 551 U.S. at 350-51;
see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 46-47 ("[A] district judge must give serious consideration to the
extent of any departure from the Guidelines and must explain his conclusion that an unusually
lenient or an unusually harsh sentence is appropriate in a particular case with sufficient
justifications.... [A]ppellate courts may ... take the degree of variance into account and consider
the extent of a deviation from the Guidelines.").
76. Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of Prior Drug
Convictions in FederalSentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1160 (2010); see AMY BARONEVANS & JENNIFER NILES COFFIN, No MORE MATH WITHOUT SUBTRACTION: DECONSTRUCTING
THE GUIDELINES' PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON MITIGATING FACTORS 76-77 (2011),

https://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics---sentencing/no moremathwithout subtraction.pdf. For a
discussion regarding the potential of mitigating factors to have a greater role in federal sentencing,
see William W. Berry III, Mitigation in FederalSentencing in the United States, in MITIGATION
AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 247 (Julian V. Roberts ed., 2011).
77. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2014,

at 1 tbl.1 (2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federalsentencing-statistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC-2014_QuarterlyReportFinal.pdf.
78. See id.
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subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be
imposed, shall consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner ... .79
The Guidelines set out over three dozen considerations that can
affect the penaltyso and several considerations that should not receive
any weight." To determine the appropriate penalty, courts may factor in
a number of mitigating and aggravating considerations, which are
formulated as "adjustments" and "departures."82
Adjustments are considerations that increase or decrease penalty by
a designated amount.8 3 For example, a demonstration of remorse can
result in a decrease of penalty by up to two levels and, if it is
accompanied by an early guilty plea, it can decrease a penalty by three
levels.84 If a departure is applicable, courts can more readily impose a
sentence outside the applicable Guidelines range." Moreover, as noted
above, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553, the Guidelines permit, in rare
instances, considerations that are not set out in the Guidelines to justify
departures from the range.86 Thus, the range of aggravating and

79.
80.

For a discussion of the operation of this provision, see Berry III, supranote 76, at 247-49.
Id.

81. For a historical overview of the development of aggravating and mitigating considerations
in the Guidelines, see BARON-EVANS & COFFIN, supra note 76, at 2-6.
82. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 3, 5, pt. K (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N

2015).
83. These are set out in chapter 3 of the Guidelines.
84. Id. § 3El. However, the Guidelines also provide that the court cannot depart from a
guideline range as a result of the following:
The defendant's decision, in and of itself, to plead guilty to the offense or to enter a plea
agreement with respect to the offense (i.e., a departure may not be based merely on the
fact that the defendant decided to plead guilty or to enter into a plea agreement, but a
departure may be based on justifiable, non-prohibited reasons as part of a sentence that is
recommended, or agreed to, in the plea agreement and accepted by the court.
Id. § 5K2.0(d)(4).
85. See id. ch. 1, pt. A, at 6-7.
86. Id. § 5K2.0(a)(2)(B); see Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 481 (2011); Gall v.
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mitigating considerations set out in the Guidelines is not exhaustive.
Where a court departs from the applicable range, it is required to state its
reason for doing so.87
This general approach to sentencing guidelines, whereby the
guidelines strongly influence penalty and define, but do not prioritize the
broad objectives of sentencing, is common." Introducing expertise into
sentencing law would not necessarily result in an abolition of sentencing
guidelines, but it could lead to profound changes to the severity of most
penalties set out in those guidelines.8 9 These changes are detailed in Part
VI of this Article. 90 We consider next, in greater detail, the problems
stemming from current sentencing practice.
III.

PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SENTENCING SYSTEM:
FINANCIALLY UNSUSTAINABLE AND UNDULY HARSH

Sentencing in the United States suffers from two main problems:
the financial cost of prisons is unsustainable, and the hardship inflicted
on prisoners is morally unjustifiable.91 These problems attest to the
"divorces between sentencing policy and either evidence or normative
theory."92 Before analyzing the normative problem of mass
incarceration, we set out in greater detail the nature and extent of the
fiscal burden that the current prison situation has generated.
A.

CurrentIncarcerationLevels Are FinanciallyUnsustainable

More than 2 million Americans are incarcerated in federal and state
prisons and local jails.93 This equates to an imprisonment rate of
approximately 700 adults for every 100,000 people in the adult
population.94 This rate has increased more than four-fold over the past
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46-53 (2007).
87. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(e).
88.

Frase & Mitchell, supranote 41.

89.

See Bagaric & Gopalan, supra note 8, at 212-16, 227-35.

90.

See infra Part VI.

91.
92.
93.

See infra Part III.A-B.
Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975-2025, 42 CRIME & JUST. 141, 146 (2013).
The exact number of prisoners is 2,217,000. Inst. of Criminal Policy Research, Highest to

Lowest-Prison Population Total, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-

lowest/prison-population-total?field region taxonomy tid=All (last visited Apr. 10, 2017); see also
E. ANN. CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
NCJ 243920, PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991-2012, at 1-6

(2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pl2tar9112.pdf (examining trends in prison admissions
and releases). For a breakdown of the incarceration numbers, see Peter Wagner & Bernadette
Rabuy, Mass Incarceration:The Whole Pie 2015, PRISON POL'Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 8, 2015), http://

www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2015.html.
94.

Inst. for Criminal Policy Research, United States of America, WORLD PRISON BRIEF,
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forty years."s The United States now has the highest incarceration rate in
the developed world,96 and by a large margin. The imprisonment rate in
most developed countries is five to ten times less than that of the United
States, 7 and on average, that rate is six times the imprisonment rate of a
typical nation in the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development ("OECD").9 8
It is now widely accepted both domestically and internationally
that the United States has a "serious over-punishment" and "mass
incarceration" problem.99 Vivien Stern, Secretary General of Penal
Reform International, stated that "[a]mong mainstream politicians and
commentators in Western Europe, it is a truism that the criminal justice
system of the United States is an inexplicable deformity.""oo
The main tangible disadvantage of the high incarceration rate in the
United States is the public cost of imprisoning so many offenders. The
total cost of corrections in the United States is $80 billion annually.' 0 1
Between 1980 and 2010, the per capita expenditure on corrections has
more than tripled, even taking into account the growing population. 10 2
http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/united-states-america (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
95.

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supranote 6, at 13.

96. Criminal Justice Facts, SENT'G PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/criminaljustice-facts (last visited Apr. 10, 2017); Nick Wing, Here Are All of the Nations That Incarcerate
More of Their Population Than the U.S., HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 13, 2013, 8:21 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/13/incarceration-rate-per-capita n 3745291.html. Current
incarceration rates are historically and comparatively unprecedented. The United States has the
highest incarceration rates in the world, reaching extraordinary absolute levels in the most recent
two decades. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supranote 6, at 68.
97. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 2.
98. MELISSA S. KEARNEY ET AL., THE HAMILTON PROJECT, BROOKINGS, TEN ECONOMIC
FACTS ABOUT CRIME AND INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICY MEMO 10 (2014). Rates

in the OECD range from 47 to 266 per 100,000 adult population. Id.; see also Wing, supra note 96
("At 716 per 100,000 people in 2013, according to the International Centre for Prison Studies, the
U.S. tops every other nation in the world. Among OECD countries, the competition isn't even
close-Israel comes in second, at 223 per 100,000.").
99. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 9-15; Adelman, supra note 1, at 295-96, 306-07;
Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration:Implications of the Iron Law of
PrisonPopulations, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 307, 323 (2009); Harcourt, supra note 1, at 970-78;
Taslitz, supra note 1, at 153-64. The problem is so acute that even a "Reverse Mass Incarceration
Act" has been proposed. LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & INIMAI M. CHETrIAR, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, THE REVERSE MASS INCARCERATION ACT 7-15 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.
org/sites/default/files/publications/TheReverseMassIncarcerationAct%20.pdf; see U.S. JUSTICE
ACTION NETWORK, REFORMING THE NATION'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE IMPACT OF 2015

AND PROSPECTS FOR 2016, at 3-6 (2015), http://www.justiceactionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/12/Justice-Action-Network-Year-End-Report.pdf
100. Vivien Stem, The InternationalImpact of US. Policies, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 279, 280 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-

Lind eds., 2002).
101. KEARNEY ET AL., supranote 98, at 13.
102. Id.
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In real terms, spending has increased from $77 yearly by each U.S.
resident in 1980 to $260 in 2010.os The scale of the spending, even for
the world's largest economy, is considerable and not readily sustainable.
It is impinging on the American government's capacity to fund vital
social services, including health and education. 10 4 A recent report by the
Center of Budget and Policy Priorities illuminates that eleven American
states spend more on prisons than on higher education.10 Overall,
American states' expenditure on incarceration in the past twenty years
has risen six times more than the rate of expenditure on higher
education."0 ' The National Research Council observes:
Budgetary allocations for corrections have outpaced budget increases
for nearly all other key government services (often by wide margins),
including education, transportation, and public assistance. Today, state
spending on corrections is the third highest category of general fund
expenditures in most states, ranked behind Medicaid and education.
Corrections budgets have skyrocketed at a time when spending
for other key social services and government programs has slowed
or contracted.1 07

It is important to recognize that there are some regional variations
in this spending. Professor Marie Gottschalk of the University of
Pennsylvania, for example, has suggested that "[s]tates spend roughly
two-to-three percent of their budgets on corrections."' 0 While
103. Id.
104. For an analysis on why mass incarceration is flawed from the financial perspective, see
Jason Furman & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Opinion, Why Mass IncarcerationDoesn 't Pay, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/opinion/why-mass-incarceration-doesnt-pay.
html? r=0.
105. MITCHELL & LEACHMAN, supra note 49, at 1. Reduced investment in education is also
occurring at the more junior education level. See id. at 10 ("In recent years, though, states have cut
education funding, in some cases by large amounts. At least 30 states are providing less general
funding per student this year for K-12 schools than in state fiscal year 2008, before the Great
Recession hit, after adjusting for inflation. In 14 states, the reduction exceeds 10%. The 3 states
with the deepest funding cuts since the recession hit-Alabama, Arizona, and Oklahoma-are
among the ten states with the highest incarceration rates." (footnote omitted)); see also Beatrice
Gitau, The Hidden Costs of Funding Prisons Instead of Schools, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR

(Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2015/1003/The-hidden-costs-of-fundingprisons-instead-of-schools (noting that eleven states spend more on prisons than universities:
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont).
106. See Gopnik, supranote 56.
107. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 314 (citation and footnote omitted); see also
KEARNEY ET AL., supra note 98, at 13.
108. BETTINA MUENSTER & JENNIFER TRONE, WHY IS AMERICA So PUNITIVE? A
REPORT ON THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE INTERDISCIPLINARY ROUNDTABLE ON PUNITIVENESS IN
AMERICA 23 (2016), http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/sites/default/files/news/Punitiveness-inAmerica
ReportMarch2016.pdf.
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Gottschalk acknowledges that "costs have been rising, second only to
Medicaid," she cautions that such expenditure remains "a drop in the
bucket," and that, for this reason, fiscal justifications for changing
sentencing policies are less important than socio-political and moral
arguments for doing so.109 By contrast, however, Ruth Wilson Gilmore
has.observed that between 1984 and 2007 the State of California built 23
major new prisons, at a cost of $280 to $350 million each (it had built
just 12 prisons between 1852 and 1964).110 In the 25 years to 2007,
California's outlay on its prison system had grown from "2 percent of
the general fund in 1982 to nearly 8 percent today," and the Department
of Corrections had become the state's largest public agency, employing
around 54,000 staff. 1
B.

Violation ofHuman Rights Through Imprisonment

In addition to the financial problems associated with mass
incarceration, there is a strong moral imperative for reforming America's
sentencing system. Emerging evidence indicates that the burden and
suffering inflicted by imprisonment-the imposition of which has been
driven in recent decades by the retributive ideal-is far greater than has
previously been understood; in fact, the hardship caused by many
sentences often exceeds the severity of the crimes for which they
were imposed.112 Indeed, one of the authors has suggested that mass
incarceration in the United States has perpetrated human rights
violations of an order that make it the most pressing domestic human
rights crisis of our time.113 A disproportionate number of the victims of
those human rights abuses are from racial minorities, especially African
Americanll4 and Latino communities,"' as well as white people from
109. Id.
110. RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION
IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 7 (2007).
111. Id.at8,10.
112. Bagaric et al., supra note 8 (manuscript at 13-18).
113. See id. (manuscript at 23-24).
114.

See Mirko Bagaric, Rich Offender, Poor Offender.

Why It (Sometimes) Matters in

Sentencing, 33 LAW & INEQ. 1, 7-9 (2015) [hereinafter Bagaric, Rich Offender, Poor Offender];
Mirko Bagaric, Three Things That a Baseline Study Shows Don't Cause Indigenous OverImprisonment; Three Things That Might but Shouldn't and Three Reforms That Will Reduce
Indigenous Over-Imprisonment, 32 HARv. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. (forthcoming 2016)

(manuscript at 31-33) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bagaric, Three Things]. However, it should
be noted that in recent years there has been a slight reduction in the extent to which African

Americans are imprisoned compared to the rest of the community, but nevertheless their overimprisonment rate is more than five to one. See Keith Humphreys, Black IncarcerationHasn 't Been
This Low in a Generation, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
The reasons that
wonk/wp/2016/08/16/black-incarceration-hasnt-been-this-low-in-a-generation.
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socially and economically deprived backgrounds,' 1 6 due to those groups'
over-representation in American prisons.
The intention of imprisonment is to punish offenders by depriving
them of their liberty. However, the incidental burdens suffered by
American prisoners can far exceed this deprivation and, cumulatively,
constitute an even greater hardship for them. Adam Gopnik notes that
America is famous "for the harshness and inhumanity of its prisons.""'
It has been observed that the "pains" of imprisonment involve the
deprivation of access to goods and services;"' the deprivation of sexual
relationships;" a limitation on the right to participate in family
relationships and the ability to procreate;120 and a higher risk of sexual
and physical victimization than the free population'2 1 (each year, more
than 70,000 prisoners are raped in America).' 22 The widespread use of
solitary confinement in particular, not only for hardened and convicted
criminals, but even for teenagers held on remand, causes extreme
suffering. Solitary confinement has been described by wardens as a
"clean version of hell," placing prisoners in "conditions [that] literally
drive people crazy . .. in deeply disturbing ways that would shock

anyone with a conscience."' 2 3 Indeed, there is "growing consensus in the
United States that solitary confinement is indeed so damaging it truly
should be a last resort or even banned."1 2 4
Gopnik notes that every day "at least fifty thousand men .. . wake
in solitary confinement, often in 'supermax' prisons or prison wings, in
which men are locked in small cells, where they see no one, cannot
freely read and write, and are allowed out just once a day for an hour's
solo 'exercise."' 1 25 A report in 2013 found that nearly twenty-seven
percent of adolescent inmates in one American prison were being held in
solitary confinement.' 26 In the notorious prison Rikers Island (abutting

black Americans are imprisoned at greater levels are discussed in Part VI.A.1.
115.

See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 34, 121-22.

116.
117.

See id. at 127-28.
Gopnik, supranote 56.

118.

GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY

PRISON 67-70 (1958).
119.

Id

at 70-71; see Robert Johnson & Hans Toch, Introduction to THE PAINS OF

IMPRISONMENT 13, 17-20 (Robert Johnson & Hans Toch eds., 1982).
120. Bagaric et al., supra note 8 (manuscript at 46).
121. See id. (manuscript at 33).
122. See id. (manuscript at 31).
123.

MUENSTER & TRONE, supra note 108, at 20.

124. Id.
125. Gopnik, supra note 56.
126.

See Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.

newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law.
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New York City), the total number of solitary beds increased by more
than sixty percent between 2007 and mid-2013.127 One Bronx teenager,
Kalief Browder, spent more than three years in Rikers between 2010 and
2013, including the last six months in solitary, without ever being
tried. 128 While in prison, Browder was beaten by guards, deprived of
food, and deprived of resources with which to continue his education. 12 9
The solitary cells were not air-conditioned and, whenever Browder left
solitary to bathe or exercise, he was handcuffed and strip-searched. Even
when Browder slept in regular quarters, he was obliged to nap with his
head resting to the side of his bed on top of a plastic bucket containing
his belongings and extra food to keep them safe.13 0
Studies have identified that following their release, prisoners and
their relatives can suffer significantly as a consequence of their
incarceration. Former inmates may have reduced life expectancy,13 1
long-term difficulties in securing employment, and lower rates of
earning over their lifetime than those who have not been imprisoned.132
They may have higher rates of divorce,133 and their incarceration
could have harmful financial, social, and health implications for their
family members. 13 4
IV.

THE FAILURE OF CURRENT SENTENCING PRACTICES TO ACHIEVE
THEIR KEY OBJECTIVES

The enormous fiscal burden and breach of fundamental human
rights wrought by the current sentencing system are especially
outrageous-almost to the point of being logically incomprehensiblein light of persuasive and extensive empirical evidence and expert
analyses confirming that the key objectives used to justify it are, for the
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
Georgia

Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
A study that examined the 15.5 year survival rate of 23,510 ex-prisoners in the State of
found much higher mortality rates for ex-prisoners than for the rest of the population. See

Anne C. Spaulding et al., Prisoner Survival Inside and Outside of the Institution: Implicationsfor

Health-CarePlanning, 173 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 479, 482 (2011). There were 2650 deaths in
total, which was a forty-three percent higher mortality rate than normally expected (799 more exprisoners died than expected). Id. The main causes for the increased mortality rates were homicide,
transportation accidents, accidental poisoning (which included drug overdoses), and suicide. Id. at
484; see NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 221-26.

132. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 247. One study estimated the earnings
reduction to be as high as forty percent. Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social
Inequality, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 8, 13.
133. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supranote 6, at 5.

134. Id. at 270.
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most part, fundamentally flawed. Specifically, it has been established
that incarceration does not meaningfully achieve sentencing aims that
are most influential at present, namely, community protection through
incapacitation and, to a lesser extent, specific deterrence and marginal
general deterrence.13 5 These goals should therefore neither guide judges'
sentencing practices nor lead them to impose harsh sanctions. The only
exception to this position is that incapacitation may be a justifiable
objective of sentencing practices in circumstances where offenders have
committed serious crimes and have previous convictions for similar
offenses. 136 There is an enormous amount of literature examining and
evaluating each of the key sentencing objectives that have been used to
justify harsher penalties. 3 7 We now summarize the major findings of
that work.
A.

Imprisonment Does Not Achieve Specific Deterrence

The aim of specific deterrence is to reduce crime by deterring
individual offenders from reoffending.' 38 It is premised on the belief that
inflicting hardship on individuals for their offenses will demonstrate that
crime does not pay and dissuade them from engaging in similar conduct
in the future to avoid experiencing such consequences again.13 9 While
the theory seems logical, research suggests that the imposition of harsh
sanctions does not have this effect.
A comprehensive analysis of studies of specific deterrence,
conducted by Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen, and Cheryl L. Jonson,
exposed that the rate of recidivism of offenders who are imprisoned is
not necessarily lower than those who receive non-custodial penalties and
may in fact be higher.140 These findings derived from a review of six
135. See infra Part IV.A-B.
136. See infra Part I.C.
137. For detailed discussion of the empirical evidence regarding the efficacy of state-imposed
criminal sanctions to achieve the goals of incapacitation, general deterrence, and specific deterrence,

see Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, (Marginal) General DeterrenceDoesn't Work - And What It
Means for Sentencing, 35 CRiM. L.J. 269, 273-77 (2011); Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, The
Capacity of Criminal Sanctions to Shape the Behaviour of Offenders: Specific Deterrence Doesn't

Work, Rehabilitation Might and the Implicationsfor Sentencing, 36 CRIM. L.J. 159, 163-65 (2012)
[hereinafter Bagaric & Alexander, The Capacity ofCriminal Sanctions];and Mirko Bagaric & Theo
Alexander, The Fallacy That Is Incapacitation:An Argument for Limiting Imprisonment Only to Sex

&

and Violent Offenders, 2 J. COMMONWEALTH CRiM. L. 95, 99-103 (2012) [hereinafter Bagaric
Alexander, The Fallacy That Is Incapacitation].

138. Bagaric & Alexander, The Capacityof CriminalSanctions, supra note 137, at 159.
139. See id.
140. Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment & Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115, 155
(2009); see DONALD RITCHIE, SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, DOES IMPRISONMENT DETER?

A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 15 (2011), https://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/sites/default/
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experimental studies in which custodial and non-custodial sentences
were randomly assigned; 141 eleven studies of matched pairs (each pair
comprised two offenders who committed the same crimes, but only one
of whom was incarcerated); 142 thirty-one studies that were regressionbased (mathematical modeling was used to determine the impact of
potentially relevant factors); 143 and seven studies of circumstances that
were not contrived by researchers. 14 4 Other studies have found that
longer terms of imprisonment do not reduce the likelihood of
reoffendifig, 145 and non-custodial sentences are associated with lower
rates of recidivism than custodial sentences. 146
A report of the Executive Office of the United States President
published in 2016 reviewed research that suggests that imprisoning
individuals can even increase the probability that they will reoffend. 147
It observes as follows:
[A] growing body of work has found that incarceration increases
recidivism... .For instance, one recent study that uses highly detailed
data from Texas . . . finds that although initial incarceration prevents

crime through incapacitation, each additional sentence year causes
an increase in future offending that eventually outweighs the
incapacitation benefit. Each additional sentence year leads to a 4 to 7
percentage point increase in recidivism after release. 148

files/publication-documents/Does%20Imprisonment%2Deter%20A%2Review%200f/o

2
Othe% 0

2

Evidence.pdf; DON WEATHERBURN ET AL., AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, THE SPECIFIC
DETERRENT EFFECT OF CUSTODIAL PENALTIES ON JUVENILE REOFFENDING 2-3 (2009).

141. Nagin et al., supra note 140, at 144-45.
142. Id. at 145-53.
143. Id. at 154-55.
144. Id. at 155. In the final category was a study of more than 20,000 prisoners in Italy who in
2006 were released early in their sentences and advised that, if they reoffended within five years,
they would be imprisoned for their remaining sentences and receive further sentences in response to
their new offenses. Id. While the prisoners' reoffending reduced by 1.24% for each month of their
remaining sentences, those who had served longer sentences initially were more likely to reoffend.
Id.
145. See Donald P. Green & Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge Assignments to Estimate the
Effects of Incarcerationand Probation on Recidivism Among Drug Offenders, 48 CRIMINOLOGY
357, 358-59 (2010).
146. SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, REOFFENDING FOLLOWING SENTENCING IN THE
MAGISTRATES' COURT OF VICTORIA, at xi (2013).
147. WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 2, at 39.

148.

Id.
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Imprisonment Does Not, Due to Its Severity, Achieve
GeneralDeterrence

Just as imprisonment does not achieve specific deterrence, so, too,
it does not, by reason of its severity, lead to general deterrence, a goal to
which judges frequently refer to justify their imposition of harsh
penalties. Empirical evidence suggests there is some validity to the
theory of "absolute general deterrence," which proposes that the mere
existence of criminal sanctions, regardless of their severity, discourages
people from committing offenses for fear of the consequences.' 4 9
Nevertheless, research shows that the notion of "marginal general
deterrence," which postulates that, the harsher a sanction, the greater its
deterrent effect, is flawed.o
In the past thirty years, the number of serious crimes committed in
the United States has decreased."' While there was also an increase in
imprisonment of offenders during this period, it is not clear that the
crime rate diminished owing to the marginal deterrent effect of this
harsh sanction.'5 2 The reduction in commission of offenses was more
likely to have been attributable to an expansion in police numbers and
thus greater probability (both perceived and actual) of detection of
crime" (which accords with the absolute deterrence theory), as well as
other socio-political and economic factors,154 and the fact that more
offenders were incapacitated and thus prevented from the commission of
offenses. Notably, at the same time in Canada, the rates of crimes
committed and imprisonment both diminished.'5 5
149. See RITCHIE, supra note 140, at 7; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS,
DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 14 (1973).
150. See RITCHIE, supra note 140, at 12.
151. JANET L. LAURITSEN & MARIBETH L. REZEY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 241656, TECHNICAL REPORT: MEASURING THE PREVALENCE OF CRIME
WITH THE NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY 4 (2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
mpcncvs.pdf.
152. See Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of Principles of
Evidence-BasedPracticeto State Sentencing Practiceand Policy, 43 U. S.F. L. REV. 585, 593-94

(2009).
153.

See Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: FourFactors That

&

Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 177 (2004) (estimating the
increase in police numbers to be about fourteen percent). For further discussion, see John E. Eck
Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent Crime? An Assessment of the

Evidence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207, 248 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds.,
2000); and Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100

J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 799 (2010).
154. See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 153, at 182-83; Michael Ellison, Abortion Cuts Crime
Says Study, GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 1999, 8:47 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/aug/10/
michaelellison.
155.

Paternoster, supranote 153, at 803.
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Having analyzed studies of the connection between harsh criminal
sanctions (other than capital punishment) and the crime rate, a 2014
report of the National Research Council noted:
Ludwig and Raphael (2003) find no deterrent effect of enhanced
sentences for gun crimes; Lee and McCrary (2009) and Hjalmarsson
(2009) find no evidence that the more severe penalties that attend
moving from the juvenile to the adult justice system deter offending;
and Helland and Tabarrok (2007) find only a small deterrent effect of
the third strike of California's three strikes law. As a consequence,
the deterrent return to increasing already long sentences is modest
at best.156
Other studies have found that even the prospect of capital
punishment does not affect homicide rates. 15 7 Such research confirms
that, while the existence of sanctions that would-be offenders wish to
avoid can be important to reducing crime, the imposition of especially
harsh sentences is not.
C. Imprisonmentfor IncapacitationIs Only Justifiedfor Some Serious
Offenders with PriorConvictionsfor Similar Offenses
The sentencing objective most commonly cited to justify the
imposition of harsh sentences is incapacitation. Behind this goal is
the assumption that imprisonment protects the community by disabling
the incarcerated from committing offenses while in prison. Yet, it is
only legitimate to imprison offenders on the basis of this aim if
those individuals would definitely commit crimes if they were not

156. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 139.
157. See, e.g., RICHARD HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE 211-12
(2d ed. 1996); NIGEL WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY 60-61, 191 (1969); Richard
Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: Deyi Vu All over Again?, 2 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303, 313, 328 (2005); John K. Cochran et al., Deterrence or
Brutalization? An Impact Assessment of Oklahoma's Return to Capital Punishment, 32
CRIMINOLOGY 107, 129 (1994); Dieter D6lling et al., Is Deterrence Effective? Results of Meta-

Analysis of Punishment, 15 EUR. J. CRIM. POL'Y RES. 201, 220 (2009); John J. Donohue III,
Assessing the Relative Benefits of Incarceration:The Overall Change over the Previous Decades
and the Benefits on the Margin, in Do PRISONS MAKE US SAFER?: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF

&

THE PRISON BOOM 269,269-72 (Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll eds., 2009); Anthony N. Doob
& Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME
JUST. 143, 145 (2003).
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incarcerated,1 58 and those offenses would have been sufficiently serious
to warrant the expense of imprisonment.
Two sentencing practices are inspired by the objective of
incapacitation. The first is "selective incapacitation," which involves
imposing prison sentences if risk assessments, based on the nature of the
crime committed or the individual offender, indicate that it is highly
probable that particular offenders will engage in further crimes.1 5 9 The
second is "general incapacitation," which involves sentencing those who
have committed crimes to imprisonment because, as a cohort, they are
more likely to reoffend, rather than because it is predicted that individual
offenders are more likely to offend again than others. 60 Selective
incapacitation is unjustifiable because available analytical tools cannot
accurately predict future offending.'"' The overall effectiveness of
general incapacitation is limited because, while it can reduce the crime
rate, that rate diminishes to a lesser extent as more people are
imprisoned, and it is mostly successful in relation to minor offenders,
who are more likely to reoffend than serious offenders, but whose
incarceration is unjustified because of the relative triviality of their
offenses. General incapacitation is only a legitimate goal of
imprisonment for the small number of serious offenders who have prior
convictions for similar offenses, because their crimes are particularly
damaging and they are more likely to reoffend.
Most research into predictors of individuals likelihood of future
offending have focused on forecasting reoffending by those who have
committed serious violent and sexual offenses.' 62 In the 1990s, a
comprehensive analysis of predictive techniques that were then available
found that those tools "tend to invite overestimation of the amount
of incapacitation to be expected from marginal increments in
imprisonment."'6 3 Despite the development since that time of advanced
actuarial tools, structured professional judgment, and criminogenic risk
assessment methods that deploy a range of variables, no techniques have
158.

See Kevin Bennardo, Incarceration'sIncapacitativeShortcomings, 54 SANTA CLARA L.

REV. 1, 11 (2014) (noting that some incapacitative models assume that prison is not part of society,
so crimes committed in prison are not taken into account in assessing the incapacitating effect of
imprisonment); see also Colin Murray, 'To Punish, Deter and Incapacitate':Incarceration and
Radicalisation, in UK PRISONS AFTER 9/11, PRISONS, TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM: CRITICAL
ISSUES IN MANAGEMENT, RADICALISATION AND REFORM 17 (Andrew Silke ed., 2013) (noting that,

for incapacitation to reduce the crime rate, it is vital that inmates do not corrupt other prisoners).
159. Bagaric & Alexander, The Fallacy That Is Incapacitation,supra note 137, at 103.
160. Id. at 107.
161. Id. at 103.
162. See id at 104-07 (discussing research predicting which serious offenders will reoffend).
163. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT
AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 86 (1995).
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yet been proven capable of accurately forecasting individuals' future
danger to the community. 16 4 All of the tools rely on prior criminal
history, which has been found to be an unreliable indicator of the
likelihood of reoffending.1 65
To some extent, general incapacitation can be effective in reducing
crime because it results in less people who may commit offenses being
at large in the community. Research suggests that increases to the rate of
imprisonment in the United States have lowered the incidence of
crime.1 6 6 Between 1993 and 2010, the imprisonment rate rose from
1.365 million to 2.27 million prisoners, 167 while the level of violent
victimization rates decreased by seventy-six percent and the decline in
total household property crime victimization was sixty-four percent.16 1
Recent studies have nonetheless exposed that the extent to which
incarceration reduces the crime rate diminishes as greater numbers of
people are imprisoned. A report from the Executive Office of the
164. See BERNADETTE MCSHERRY & PATRICK KEYZER, SEX OFFENDERS AND PREVENTIVE
DETENTION: POLITICS, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2009); ADRIAN RAINE, ANATOMY OF VIOLENCE:
THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF CRIME 7-8 (2013); Jessica Black, Is the Preventive Detention of
Dangerous Offenders Justifiable?, 6 J. APPLIED SEC. RES. 317, 322-23 (2011); Christopher
Slobogin, Legal Limitations on the Scope ofPreventive Detention, in DANGEROUS PEOPLE: POLICY,
PREDICTION, AND PRACTICE 37, 38 (Bernadette McShcrry & Patrick Keyzer eds., 2011). The LSI-R
assessment model, which is used in New South Wales, has fifty-four variables. See NEW SOUTH
WALES SENTENCING COUNCIL, HIGH-RISK VIOLENT OFFENDERS: SENTENCING AND POSTCUSTODY MANAGEMENT OPTIONS § 2.86, at 23-24 (2012), http://www.sentencingcouncil.justice.
nsw.gov.au/Documents/SentencingSeriousViolentOffenders/online%20final%20report%20hrvo.
pdf.
165. For a summary of the literature, see MICHAEL E. EZELL & LAWRENCE E. COHEN,
DESISTING FROM CRIME: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN LONG-TERM CRIME PATTERNS OF SERIOUS
CHRONIC OFFENDERS 53-100 (2005); Kathleen Auerhahn, Conceptual and Methodological Issues
in the Prediction of Dangerous Behavior, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 771, 772-76 (2006);
Michael E. Ezell, The Effect of Criminal History Variables on the Process of Desistance in

Adulthood Among Serious Youthful Offenders, 23 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 28, 29-31 (2007); and
Lila Kazemian, Assessing the Impact of a Recidivist Sentencing Premium on Crime and Recidivism
Rates, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 227,

228-42 (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010).

&

166. See William Spelman, The LimitedImportance ofPrison Expansion, in THE CRIME DROP
IN AMERICA 97, 97 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000) ("[Clrime levels appear to have
(at last) responded [to the rates of imprisonment], dropping to their lowest level in years."); William
Spelman, What Recent Studies Do (and Don't) Tell Us About Imprisonment and Crime, 27 CRIME
JUST. 419, 485 (2000).
167. See TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
156241, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1993, at iii (1995), http://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpop93bk.pdf (conveying the 1.365 million figure as including inmates in
local jails (456,000) and state and federal prisons (909,000)); see also LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 236319, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2010, at 3 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpusl0.pdf (conveying the
2.27 million figure as the sum of inmates in local jails (749,000) and state and federal prisons
(1,518,000)).
168. See LAURITSEN & REZEY, supranote 151, at 1.
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President of the United States, titled Economic Perspectives on

Incarcerationand the CriminalJustice System, notes:
Criminal sanctions have the capacity to reduce crime through
deterrence and incapacitation; however, marginal increases in
incarceration may have small and declining benefits. Despite a large
expansion in the prison population over the last several decades, a
large body of research has generally found that the aggregate impact of
incarceration on crime is modest and that it declines as the prison
population grows. Researchers who study crime and incarceration
believe that the true impact of incarceration on crime reduction is
small, with a 10 percent increase in incarceration decreasing crime by
just 2 percent or less.' 69
Similarly, in 2014, after surveying data regarding the impact of
incapacitation policy in the United States in recent decades, the National
Research Council concluded:
Many studies have attempted to estimate the combined incapacitation
and deterrence effects of incarceration on crime using panel data at the
state level from the 1970s to the 1990s and 2000s. Most studies
estimate the crime-reducing effect of incarceration to be small
and some report that the size of the effect diminishes with the scale
of incarceration.

. .

. On balance, panel data studies

support the

conclusion that the growth in incarceration rates reduced crime, but the
magnitude of the crime reduction remains highly uncertain and the
evidence suggests it was unlikely to have been large. 170
Any effectiveness of general incapacitation in reducing the crime
rate is mainly achieved in relation to minor offenders because, as a
cohort, they are proven to be especially likely to reoffend.17 1
Nevertheless, the cost of imprisoning such offenders is difficult to justify
given the minimal impact of their crimes on the community. 172 Some

169. WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF EcoN. ADVISORS, supra note 2, at 36 (footnotes omitted).
170. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 155.
171. See JESSICA ZHANG & ANDREW WEBSTER, AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, AN
ANALYSIS OF REPEAT IMPRISONMENT TRENDS IN AUSTRALIA USING PRISONER CENSUS

DATA FROM 1994 To 2007, at 30 (2010), http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/
26D48B9A4BE29D48CA25778C001F67D3/$File/1351055031 aug%202010.pdf; see also 93 DON
WEATHERBURN ET AL., N.S.W. BUREAU OF CRIME STATISTICS & RESEARCH, CRIME & JUSTICE
BULLETIN, How MUCH CRIME DOES PRISON STOP?: THE INCAPACITATION EFFECT OF PRISON

ON BURGLARY app. at 12 (2006), http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Documents/CJB/cjb93.pdf; Ben
Vollaard, Preventing Crime Through Selective Incapacitation, 123 ECON. J. 262, 278-83 (2012).
172. It is nonetheless extremely challenging to undertake an accurate cost-benefit analysis of
imprisonment given the large number of speculative figures involved. See, e.g., David S. Abrams,
The Imprisoner'sDilemma: A Cost-Benefit Approach to Incarceration,98 IOWA L. REV. 905, 91516(2013).
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Australian research, for instance, establishes not only that imprisoning
large numbers of offenders can lower the crime rate due to their
probability of reoffending, but also that the expense of relying on
incarceration to reduce that rate is disproportionately high. A 2006
study measured the impact of imprisonment on the rate of burglaries
and concluded:
[A]t least so far as burglary is concerned, prison does seem to be an
effective crime control tool. Our best estimate of the incapacitation
effect of prison on burglary (based on the assumption that burglars
commit an average of 38 burglaries per year when free) is 26 per
cent . . [which] is equivalent to preventing over 44,700 burglaries
per annum.173

The report also noted, however, as follows:
[A] doubling of the sentence length for burglary would cost an
additional $26 million per annum but would only reduce the annual
number of burglaries by about eight percentage points. A doubling of
the proportion of convicted burglars would produce a larger effect
(about 12 percentage points) but only if those who are the subject of
our new penal policy offend as frequently as those who are currently
being imprisoned. Given what we know about the frequency of
offending amongst burglars who do not currently receive a prison
sentence, this seems highly unlikely. 174
General incapacitation is nonetheless a justifiable objective of
imprisonment in relation to the small cohort of offenders who commit
serious offenses and have previous convictions for similar crimes. 175
While most serious offenders do not reoffend (and hence individuals'
previous criminal behavior is an imprecise determinant of whether they
will reoffend), individuals with prior convictions for serious offenses,
particularly sexual and violent crimes, commit such crimes at a much
greater frequency than the rest of the criminal population.176 These
offenses also cause the most harm. It is for this reason, as Part V
discusses further below, that we recommend a bifurcated system of
sentencing, which would see imprisonment reserved mainly for serious
sexual and violent offenders.177
173.

WEATHERBURN ET AL., supra note 171, at 8.

174. Id. at 9.
175. See, e.g., Vollaard, supra note 171, at 278-83.
176. Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime-Not the Prior Convictions of the
Person That Committed the Crime: An Argument for Less Impact Being Accorded to Previous

Convictions in Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 343, 410 (2014).
177. For recent discussion regarding the nature of violent offenses, see generally JUSTICE
POLICY INST., DEFINING VIOLENCE: REDUCING INCARCERATION BY RETHINKING AMERICA'S
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THE CURRENT OPPORTUNITY FOR EXPERT-BASED
SENTENCING REFORM

For decades, erudite, respected scholars in the United States have
highlighted flaws in the sentencing objectives, and mandatory penalty
regimes, which have driven many of the judicial and legislative
responses to offenders and led to the present crisis of mass
incarceration."' While their work has to now seemingly fallen on deaf
ears, there is finally hope that the gulf between sentencing knowledge
and practice will be narrowed, and a more rational and principled
sentencing system will be implemented. A broad and influential cross
section of American society has vociferously endorsed the need for
change, some reforms have already been made, and there is support in
the general community for diminishing harsh sanctions.
Several politicians at the highest levels have spearheaded the calls
to lower the rate of incarceration and length of prison terms. In 2013,
while still in office, then-U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder observed,
"[T]oo many Americans go to too many prisons for far too long, and for
no truly good law enforcement reason. It's clear, at a basic level, that
20th-century criminal justice solutions are not adequate to overcome our
21st-century challenges."' 79 He is now expressly calling for lower
incarceration levels and noting that this will not make America less
safe."so In 2015, then Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates
made similar comments and emphasized that at present there is
substantial support, regardless of political affiliation, for change:
These days, there's a lot of talk about criminal justice reform. We are
at a unique moment in our history, where a bipartisan consensus is
emerging around the critical need to improve our current system.
About a month ago, a coalition of Republican and Democratic senators
unveiled a bill-called the sentencing reform and corrections act-to
address proportionality in sentencing, particularly for lower level, nonAPPROACH TO VIOLENCE (2016), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/

jpi definingviolencefinal_report.pdf.
178. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supranote 6, at 116-17, 121-22; TONRY, supra note
6, at 134; Alschuler, supra note 6, at 89-95; Berman & Bibas, supra note 6, at 40-54; Frase,
Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 6, at 627-34; Frase, Sentencing Principles in Practice, supra
note 6, at 415-22; Spohn, supra note 6, at 536-39. See generally Tonry, Crime and Human Rights,
supra note 6; Tonry, Remodeling American Sentencing, supranote 6.

179. Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association's House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/attomey-general-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-annual-meeting-american-bar-associations.
180. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Opinion, Eric Holder: We Can Have Shorter Sentences and Less
Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/14/opinion/sunday/eric-hholder-mandatory-minimum-sentences-full-of-errors.html.
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violent drug offenders. In short, we need to make sure that the
punishment fits the crime.181
The bipartisan support for sentencing reform was manifest in the
2016 presidential campaign. Former Democratic Party candidate Bernie
Sanders promised that, if elected President, "at the end of [his] first term,
we [would] not have more people in jail than any other country,"182
while Hillary Clinton has also called for concrete changes to "end the
era of mass incarceration.""' Members of the Republican Party
have similarly proposed softening sentencing laws.184 The New York
Times noted:
The last time a Clinton and a Bush ran for president, the country
was awash in crime and the two parties were competing to show who
could be tougher on murderers, rapists and drug dealers. Sentences
were lengthened and new prisons sprouted up across the country.
But more than two decades later, declared and presumed
candidates for president are competing over how to reverse what they
see as the policy excesses of the 1990s and the mass incarceration that
has followed. Democrats and Republicans alike are putting forth ideas
to reduce the prison population and rethink a system that has locked up
a generation of young men, particularly African-Americans.185
For the first time in living memory, as Holly Harris and Andrew
Howard highlight, politicians are recognizing and demonstrating that
"tough on crime" is not innately politically popular:
First and foremost, it is conservatives in big red states like Texas,
Georgia, and South Carolina who have led the way on justice reform
issues for a decade. These efforts yielded great success in safely
reducing the prison population, saving significant taxpayer resources,
181. Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks on
Criminal Justice Reform at Columbia Law School (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/speech/deputy-attomey-general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-remarks-criminal-justice-reform;
see Ken Cuccinelli, Opinion, Criminal Justice Reform: Conservative States Have a Record of

Success. So Why Ignore It?, Fox NEWS (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2015/11/
05/critics-federal-criminal-justice-reform-ignore-decade-long-success-in-conservative-states.html.
182.

German Lopez, Bernie Sanders Just Set an Impossibly Ambitious Goal to Reverse Mass

Incarceration, Vox (Feb. 11, 2016, 9:55 PM), http://www.vox.com/2016/2/8/10937468/berniesanders-mass-incarceration (quoting Bernie Sanders at a New Hampshire rally).
183.

Our Criminal Justice System Is Out of Balance, HILLARY FOR AM., https://www.

hillaryclinton.com/issues/criminal-justice-reform (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
184.

See Evan Halper, Clinton's Call for Easing Harsh Sentencing Laws Is Echoed by

Republican Rivals, L.A. TIMEs (Apr. 29, 2015, 6:48 PM), http://www.latimes:com/nation/politics/
la-pn-clinton-prison-reform-20150429-story.html.
185.

Peter Baker, 2016 Candidates Are United in Call to Alter Justice System, N.Y.

TMEs (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/28/us/politics/being-less-tough-on-crimeis-2016-consensus.html?r-0.
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and most importantly lowering crime and recidivism rates. . . . Surveys
in states that will have hotly-contested Senate races such as Florida,
Illinois, North Carolina, Nevada, and Speaker Ryan's home state of
Wisconsin show support for reform issues ranging from the 60s to high
80s. The smart political play is to embrace these reforms. Doing
otherwise could backfire. Just ask Alaska's then-incumbent Senator
Mark Begich. In the state's 2014 U.S. Senate race, Begich attacked his
Republican opponent, Dan Sullivan, alleging he was soft on crime.
Sullivan emerged victorious over Begich and is currently serving as
the junior senator from Alaska. 186

There have been some recent noteworthy changes to sentencing
practices that are intended to reduce the number of people who are
imprisoned. In 2014, the U.S. Sentencing Commission voted to lower
the sentencing guideline level for most federal drug trafficking
offenses. 8 A report by the Vera Institute of Justice found that
forty-six American states passed legislation in 2014 and 2015 that, in
response to relevant empirical evidence, was
creating or expanding opportunities to divert people away from the
criminal justice system; reducing prison populations by enacting
sentencing reform, expanding opportunities for early release from
prison, and reducing the number of people admitted to prison for
violating the terms of their community supervision. 188

Several states have reduced prison terms for property and drug
offenses.189 Notably, in 2014, California voters approved California
Proposition 47, Reduced Penalties for Some Crimes Initiative,' 90 which
186.

Holly Harris & Andrew Howard, Ryan's Victory Trumps Justice Reform Opponents,

HILL (Aug. 15, 2016, 4:51 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/crime/291500-ryans-victorytrumps-justice-reform-opponents.

187. News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes to Reduce
Drug Trafficking Sentences (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/pressreleases-and-news-advisories/press-releases/20140410_Press Release.pdf.
188. REBECCA SILBER ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE IN REVIEW: NEW TRENDS IN
STATE SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 2014-2015, at 3 (2016); see id at 7. Wide-ranging reforms
are occurring in Ohio and Michigan. See U.S. JUSTICE ACTION NETWORK, supra note 99, at 10.
Similar reforms are occurring in Texas. See Adam Brandon et al., Congress Should Follow the Red
States' Lead on Criminal-Justice Reform, NAT'L REV. (May 2, 2016), http://www.nationalreview.
com/article/434783/criminal-justice-reform-conservatives-have-led-way. For a summary of recent

changes in some states to lower penalties for property, drunk driving, and other low-level offenders,
see Sarah Breitenbach, Prisons, Policing at Forefront of State Criminal Justice Action,
PEW CHARITABLE TRs. (June 27, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/

stateline/2016/06/27/prisons-policing-at-forefront-of-state-criminal-justice-action.
189.

REBECCA SILBER ET AL., supra note 188, at 23-25.

190. This law brings about the following key changes: it "[r]equires misdemeanor sentence
instead of felony for certain drug possession offenses" and "for the following crimes when amount
involved is $950 or less: petty theft, receiving stolen property, and forging/writing bad checks"; it

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 5

816

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:785

relaxed California's mandatory penalty regime by reducing some nonviolent offenses from felonies to misdemeanors.19 1 Further, the Federal
Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015192 aims to lower
mandatory minimum penalties for a large number of non-violent
offenses.' While it appears that Congress may not pass this bill, 1 94 the
facts that it received bipartisan support and, if enacted, would
considerably reduce federal prison numbers reflect the current appetite
for change. A key aspect of the above reforms is that, although they are
significant, they are piecemeal and not grounded in an overarching
jurisprudential or empirical foundation. The proposals in this Article
seek to achieve wide-ranging, principled, and sustainable evidencebased reform.
Mainstream media has also exposed social injustices and fiscal
problems induced by mass incarceration. In 2014, Rolling Stone
magazine published a piece criticizing the lengthy sentences meted out
to "tens of thousands" of non-violent drug offenders in the face of
"lawyers, scholars and judges" repeated denunciation of "mandatory
drug sentencing as oppressive and ineffective."' 9 ' The following year,
HBO screened a documentary, Fixing the System, that reinforced the
urgent need to reduce the rate of imprisonment.196 The New York Times
"[a]llows felony sentence for these offenses if person has previous conviction for crimes such as
rape, murder, or child molestation or is registered sex offender"; and it "[r]equires resentencing for
persons serving felony sentences for these offenses unless court finds unreasonable public safety
risk." CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION

GuIDE 34 (Nov. 4, 2014), http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/en/pdf/complete-vigrl.pdf.
191. The law was passed with a majority of fifty-nine percent of voters in favor. Kristina
Davis, Calif Cuts Penalties for Small Drug Crimes, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Nov. 4, 2014,

8:04

PM),

http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2014/nov/04/prop-47-misdemeanor-law-

vote-election-drug; see also San FranciscoCalled a Model for Ending Mass Incarceration, CRIME

REP. (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/articles/2015-12-san-francisco-called-amodel-for-ending-mass-incarce. For an overview of the impact of the reform, see Rob Kuznia,
An Unprecedented Experiment in Mass Forgiveness, WASH. POsT (Feb. 8, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/an-unprecedented-experiment-in-mass-forgiveness/2016/02/08/

45899f9c-a059-11e5-a3c5-c77f2cc5a43c story.html.
192. S. 2123, 114th Cong. (2015).
193. For a summary of the key aspects of this legislation, see With SRCA Now "Officially"
&

Dead... Send Your "Thanks" to (Failingsof) Prez Obama and BipartisanBungling, SENT'G L.

POL'Y (July 1, 2016), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw andpolicy/2016/07/with-srcanow-officially-dead-send-your-thanks-to-failings-of-prez-obama-and-bipartisan-bungling.html.
194. Id.; see also Seung Min Kim & Burgess Everett, Time Running Out for Major Criminal
Justice Bill, POLITICO (Apr. 20, 2016, 6:06 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/04/senatejustice-crime-bill-222225.
195.

Andrea Jones, The Nation's Shame: The Injustice of Mandatory Minimums, ROLLING

STONE (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-nations-shame-the-injusticeof-mandatory-minimums-20141007.
196. See Gregory Korte, Obama Launches Criminal Justice Tour: 'Something I'll Keep
Fighting for,' USA TODAY (Oct. 17, 2015, 7:25 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
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has published articles highlighting that the American government's
investment in prisons exceeds its spending on food stamps,1 97 advocating
for reduced sentences,198 and discussing the proposed new federal
sentencing laws that would lower sentences for some non-violent
offenses.' 9 9 In The Atlantic, Alex Lichtenstein opined that mass
incarceration is a means of managing those who most require help and
conferring advantages on those who least need them:
Mass incarceration is not just (or even mainly) a response to crime, but
rather a perverse form of social spending that uses state power to
address a host of social problems at the back end, from poverty to drug
addiction to misbehavior in school. These are problems that voters,
taxpayers, and politicians-especially white voters, taxpayers, and
politicians-seem unwilling to address in any other way. And even as
this spending exacts a toll on those it targets, it confers economic
benefits on others, creating employment in white rural areas, an
enormous government-sponsored market in prison supplies, and cheap
labor for businesses. This is what the historian Mike Davis once called
"carceral keynesianism." 200
Police officials, prosecutors, and attorneys general have pleaded for
reductions in rates of incarceration, too. In 2015, Law Enforcement
Leaders to Reduce Crime and Incarceration, which comprised 130
of these personnel from all the states, issued a press release quoting
its Co-Chair, Garry McCarthy, Superintendent of the Chicago
Police Department:
As the public servants working every day to keep our citizens safe, we
can say from experience that we can bring down both incarceration and
crime together. ... Good crime control policy does not involve

arresting and imprisoning masses of people. It involves arresting and
imprisoning the right people. Arresting and imprisoning low-level
politics/2015/10/17/obama-criminal-justice-reform-tour-charleston-heroin/74090902;

Watch VICE's

Historic Conversation with President Obama, VICE (Sept. 20, 2015, 10:31 PM), http://www.vice.

com/read/fixing-the-system-prisons-obama-shane-smith-hbo.
197.

Eduardo Porter, In the US., Punishment Comes Before the Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29,

2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/business/economy/in-the-us-punishment-comes-beforethe-crimes.html? r-0.
198. The Editorial Board, Editorial, Cut Sentences for Low-Level Drug Crimes, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/23/opinion/cut-sentences-for-low-level-drugcrimes.html.
199. The Editorial Board, Editorial, Toward Saner, More Effective Prison Sentences, N.Y.

TIMES (Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/opinion/sunday/toward-saner-moreeffective-prison-sentences.html?_r-0.
200.

Alex Lichtenstein, Mass IncarcerationHas Become the New Welfare, ATLANTIC (Sept.

16, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/mass-incarceration-has-become-thenew-welfare/404422.
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offenders prevents us from focusing resources on violent crime. While
some may find it counterintuitive, we know that we can reduce crime
and reduce unnecessary arrests and incarceration at the same time.201
Community attitudes to criminal sanctions for offenders are also
changing. In a 2013 poll, seventy-one percent of American respondents
supported the abolition of mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent drug offenses, while seventy-seven percent of respondents
endorsed the same proposal in 2014.202 Even most victims of crime now
seem to support more lenient sentences. A recent article in the
Washington Post reports:
A first-of-its-kind national survey finds that victims of crime say
they want to see shorter prison sentences, less spending on prisons
and a greater focus on the rehabilitation of criminals. The
survey . . polled the attitudes and beliefs of more 800 crime victims
pooled from a nationally representative sample of over 3,000
respondents ....
Perhaps to the surprise of some, the National Survey
on Victims' Views found that the overwhelming majority of crime
victims believe that the criminal justice system relies too heavily on
incarceration, and strongly prefer investments in treatment and
prevention to more spending on prisons and jails." 203
Thus, there is now considerable momentum for sentencing reform.
This Article proposes measures to capitalize on the apparent
receptiveness to change, with a view to being a further catalyst for wideranging evidence-based reform. 20 4

201. Notable New Group Advocating for Sentencing Reforms: Law Enforcement Leaders to
Reduce Crime and Incarceration,SENT'G L. & POL'Y (Oct. 21, 2015), http://sentencing.typepad.

com/sentencing lawandpolicy/2015/10/notable-new-group-advocating-for-sentencing-reformslaw-enforcement-leaders-to-reduce-crime-and-inca.html.
202.

REAsON-RUPE, PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY: OCTOBER 2014 TOPLINE RESULTS 4 (2014),

http://reason.com/assets/db/14128084586864.pdf
203. Christopher Ingraham, Even Violent Crime Victims Say Our Prisons Are Making Crime
Worse, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/08/05/
&

even-violent-crime-victims-say-our-prisons-are-making-crime-worse (quoting ALL. FOR SAFETY
JUSTICE, CRIME SURVIVORS SPEAK: THE FIRST-EVER NATIONAL SURVEY OF VICTIMS' VIEWS ON

SAFETY AND JUSTICE 13 (2016), https://www.allianceforsafetyandjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/
documents/Crime%20Survivors%2OSpeak%20Report.pdf).
204. It should be noted that all of the momentum is towards less incarceration. Senator Tom
Cotton has recently stated that the United States is suffering from "under-incarceration." See Nick
Gass, Sen. Tom Cotton: U.S. Has 'Under-IncarcerationProblem,' POLITICO (May 19, 2016, 2:16

PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/05/tom-cotton-under-incarceration-223371. However, this
view is not common place.
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CAUSES OF THE CURRENT PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS TO
OVERCOMING-OR AT LEAST DILUTING-THEM

While there is some momentum for real sentencing change, in order
for this to be implemented in a coherent, sustainable, and effective
manner, it is necessary to understand more fully the reasons for the
current failings of the sentencing system. This inquiry will help us
understand how to negate or at least dilute the impact of those
influences, so that evidence-based sentencing reform can be introduced
to make the system fairer and more efficient.205
A.

Punitive Attitudes to CriminalJustice

A major reason for the mass incarceration crisis is the distinctively
punitive attitude that American society has evinced for decades and even
hundreds of years towards criminal justice. This attitude has its origins
in diverse and interrelated social, institutional, and economic causes, and
its strength is easier to understand in the context of a broad, if
necessarily pr6cised, explanation of the long and complex history of
criminal justice philosophy and policy in the United States.2 0 6 To ensure
that evidence-based reform of the sentencing system can take place, it
is critical both to appreciate the bases of the attitude and to minimize
their impact.
1. Race and Criminal Justice
The single most important determinant of punitive attitudes to
criminal justice in the United States is race. The National Research
Council of the National Academies has stated that "public opinion about
crime and punishment"20 7 in America "is highly racialized."20 8 It has also
stated that racial prejudice is strongly "associated with increased support
for punitive penal policies."209 The Interdisciplinary Roundtable on
Punitiveness in America has similarly reported that racial prejudice,
contrary to expectations, has not fundamentally changed since the
twentieth century and that jurors (and by implication, judicial officials)
are still "more likely to remember information about aggressive behavior
by black defendants and to remember information about mitigating
factors when the defendant is white."210
205.
206.

See infra Part VI.A-B.
See infra Part VI.A.1-5.

207.

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supranote 6, at 123.

208. Id.
209. Id. at 122.
210.

MUENSTER & TRONE, supra note 108, at 26.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

820

[Vol. 45:785

More important, race has played, and continues to play, a vital role
not just in the application of problematic criminal justice policies but
especially in their development. And it is here that history, in the form of
long-held fears and antipathies, intersects with the criminal justice
system, often with devastating effects.
In simple terms, the intersection of racial prejudice and criminal
justice means that racial minorities, especially African Americans, are
subjected in far greater numbers to controversial policies such as "stop
and frisk" laws, which empower police to detain citizens arbitrarily and
subject them to a personal search.2 1' Further, these laws are actually
developed (however consciously) for policing such minorities. And this
logic applies not just to relatively recent laws like "stop and frisk," but
also to a raft of measures stretching back to the nineteenth century. As
Khalil Gibran Muhammad, Director of the Schomburg Center for
Research in Black Culture at the New York Public Library, notes,
throughout American history demographers and criminal justice
advocates have built the concept of racial differences into their
understanding of the causes of criminal behavior.2 12 Thus, whether it has
been based on "colonial witness testimony, antebellum newspaper
accounts, or more recently, modem uniform crime reports," 2 13 criminal
justice has consistently developed in ways that assume that "black
people are trapped by inherent or learned pathologies," 21 4 and must
therefore be "subject to heightened law enforcement and more
punitive punishment."215
In addition, it is important to recall that race has long obstructed
and even wholly prevented criminal justice authorities from accepting
the rehabilitative purposes of prison. As Gottschalk has observed, "the
association in the South of crime and race made it impossible to embrace
rehabilitation, the raison d'dtre for the penitentiary."21 6 Thus, across
many states in the re-unified Union, white majorities used lynching as a
preferred method for controlling African Americans' movements and
ambitions. And just as more than eighty percent of lynchings between
1889 and 1918 occurred in the Deep South, so, too, have more than
eighty percent of the almost 1400 judicial executions that have taken

211. ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN & JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A RED HERRING:
MARIJUANA ARRESTEES Do NOT BECOME VIOLENT FELONS (2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/

2012/1 1/23/red-herring/marijuana-arrestees-do-not-become-violent-felons.
212. Id. at 14-15.
213. Id
214. Id. at 15.
215. Id
216.

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 125.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss3/5

36

Bagaric et al.: Bringing Sentencing into the 21st Century: Closing the Gap Betwee

2017]

BRINGING SENTENCING INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

821

place in the United States since 1976.217 Thus, we must take seriously
the arguments of scholars like Gibran Muhammad, who contend that the
contemporary criminal justice system has by design allowed "elected
officials and the public [to perpetuate] racism in America while
[ostensibly] consigning stereotypical racist figures to the past." 2 18
According to this line of reasoning, we should not be surprised at
the explosion in prisoner numbers in America. For scholars such as
Robert Perkinson, author of Texas Tough: The Rise ofAmerica's Prison
Empire, it is inarguable that America's criminal justice system has
always enforced white supremacy. 21 9 And the rapid, exponential growth
in incarceration rates from the 1960s was a response not just to rising
crime rates, but also to problems posed by the Great Migration of
African Americans to Pacific and Northern industrial centers, as well as
the civil rights movement. 22 0 The threat of racial integration, across the
entire United States, stimulated the reimposition of "Jim Crow" through
mass imprisonment. 22 1 Thus, even in the ostensibly more "liberal"
Pacific and Northern states, the prison population comprises
predominantly of young, undereducated black men, who "pass quickly
from a period of police harassment into a period of 'formal control'
(i.e., actual imprisonment),"222 where they become "doomed for life
to a system of 'invisible control' . . . [p]revented from voting, legally

discriminated against for the rest of their lives," and cycling
repeatedly "back through the prison system." 2 23 Thus, the criminal
justice system performs the racial separation for which it has precisely
been designed.224
It is important to note that sentencing and criminal laws are racially
neutral on their face; no criminal laws expressly target or discriminate
against racial minorities. Nevertheless, the criminal laws, and especially
the sentencing system, operate unfairly against some racial minorities
because of the manner in which they are enforced and applied. There are
a number of ways in which the law disproportionality targets racial
minorities and in particular, African Americans.
Law enforcement agencies in many American states police urban,
densely-populated, and largely black neighborhoods more rigorously

217.

MUENSTER & TRONE, supra note 108, at 16.

218.
219.

Id.
Gopnik, supra note 56.

220.

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 109-10, 112.

221.
222.
223.
224.

Gopnik, supra note 56.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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than areas mostly inhabited by white, wealthier people.225 Consequently,
police detect more crimes, especially minor offenses, committed by
racial minorities than by white people. 226 The rate of commission of
offenses in urban communities can be high due to poverty. Researchers
have found that poor people are more likely to commit crimes than those
who are affluent,227 and African Americans are the most socially and
economically disadvantaged social group in the United States. The
African American population is almost three times poorer than white
Americans (twenty-eight percent compared to ten percent).228 White
Americans are employed at virtually double the rate of African

225. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilegeof Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 30 (1998); K. Babe Howell, ProsecutorialDiscretionand the Duty to Seek
Justice in an OverburdenedCriminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 286, 290-91,
296-99 (2014); Tracey L. McCain, The Interplay of Editorial and ProsecutorialDiscretion in the
Perpetuationof Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 25 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 601, 602

n.5 (1992) (quoting THOMAS M. UHLMAN, RACIAL JUSTICE 13 (1979)); Kim Farbota, Black
Crime Rates: What Happens When Numbers Aren't Neutral, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 2, 2015,

3:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kim-farbota/black-crime-rates-your-st-b_8078586.html.
226. Howell, supra note 225, at 286, 290-91, 296-99; Task Force on Race & the Criminal
Justice Sys., PreliminaryReport on Race and Washington's Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE

U. L. REV. 623, 636, 642-44 (2012).
227.

See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Hard Times, Hard Time: Retributive Justice for Unjustly

Disadvantaged Offenders, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 47-48, 59-69 (arguing that punishment
should depend on poverty, subject to variables like type of crime committed); Harry J. Holzer et al.,
The Economic Costs of Childhood Poverty in the United States, 14 J. CHILD. & POVERTY 41, 48-

50, 52 (2008) ("[C]hildhood poverty imposes costs on American society . .. [ofj about $500 billion
per year."); Don Weatherbum & Bronwyn Lind, What Mediates the Macro-Level Effects of
Economic and Social Stress on Crime?, 39 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 384, 393-94 (2006)
(noting that parental neglect has a stronger connection with crime than poverty, however, there is a

strong link between poverty and parental neglect). For a discussion of the link between poverty and
homicide, see William Alex Pridemore, Poverty Matters: A Reassessment of the InequalityHomicide Relationship in Cross-NationalStudies, 51 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 739, 752-53, 762-64
(2011); and Paul B. Stretesky et al., Space Matters: An Analysis ofPoverty, Poverty Clustering, and

Violent Crime, 21 JUST. Q. 817, 829, 830 tbl.1, 832, 836-37 (2004). For a general discussion of the
link between poverty and violent crime, see Avelardo Valdez et al., Aggressive Crime, Alcohol and
Drug Use, and ConcentratedPoverty in 24 US. Urban Areas, 33 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL

ABUSE 595, 600, 602 (2007); and see also N.S.W. DEP'T OF JUV. JUST., 2003 N.S.W. YOUNG
PEOPLE IN CUSTODY HEALTH SURVEY: KEY FINDINGS REPORT 12-13 tbls.1, 2, 3 & 4 (2003)

(discussing the results of a survey into the background, health, and risk behavior of young
Australians in custody); Morgan Kelly, Inequality and Crime, 82 REV. ECON. & STATS. 530, 53033 (2000) (discussing the relation between various types of crime and inequality); and Robert E.
Larzelere & Gerald R. Patterson, Parental Management: Mediator of the Effect of Socioeconomic
Status on Early Delinquency, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 301, 312, 314-18 (1990) (finding that the effect of

socioeconomic status on delinquency was not significant after controlling parental monitoring and
discipline).
228. Brad Plumer, These Ten Charts Show the Black-White Economic Gap Hasn't Budged in
50 Years, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Aug. 28, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/

wonk/wp/2013/08/28/these-seven-charts-show-the-black-white-economic-gap-hasnt-budged-in-50years/?utm_term=.c7442d280b40 (summarizing data from official government sources).
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Americans, 2 29 and the median household income of African Americans
is $32,068 compared with $54,620 for white Americans. 230 Eighty
percent of white Americans compared with about sixty-two percent of
African Americans complete high school, 231 and the rate of
imprisonment of African Americans who have not completed high
school is rising. 232 Statistics compiled in 2008 show that over two-thirds
of African American males who had not completed high school would
serve a term of imprisonment during their lives and those under the age
of thirty-five were less likely to be employed than imprisoned.23 3
While the link between poverty and crime is complex and
somewhat obscure, it is possible to identify reasons why, given their
circumstances, poor people may be more inclined to commit crimes than
their wealthier counterparts. 234 Social and economic deprivation-and
inequalities experienced by poor people due to racism, lack of resources
and opportunities,2 35 substandard education, and, in some cases, violent
neighborhoods and single-parent families236-may induce feelings of
frustration, rebellion, and aggression that impel them to commit
crimes. 237 Parents may unwittingly foster their children's aberrant
behavior if they are unable to curb it or neglect their children owing to
their poor circumstances. 23 8 Further, poor people can lack the freedom,
employment, opportunity, and power that more affluent individuals risk
losing from committing crimes.

229. Id. (noting that 12.6% of African Americans are unemployed compared to 6.6% of white
Americans).

230. Id.
231. Christopher B. Swanson & Sterling C. Lloyd, Graduation Rate Approaching Milestone,
32 EDUC. WK. 22, 22 (2013).
232.

Western & Pettit, supra note 132, at 10 fig. 1 (noting that the rate of incarceration of

African American men who have dropped out of high school in the United States has surged from
ten percent in 1980 to thirty-seven percent in 2008).
233. Id at 12, 16.
234.

Craig Haney, Evolving Standards ofDecency: Advancing the Nature andLogic ofCapital

Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 863-75 (2008); see also Bagaric, Rich Offender, Poor
Offender, supra note 114, at 10-13 (stating reasons for the link between crime and poverty).
235. See Judith R. Blau & Peter M. Blau, The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan Structure and

Violent Crime, 47 AM. Soc. REV. 114, 115-17 (1982); Michele Estrin Gilman, The Poverty Defense,
47 U. RICH. L. REV. 495, 499-502, 508-10 (2013).
236. Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a
Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 24, 28-33 (1985); see also

Haney, supra note 234, at 865-66.
237. Blau & Blau, supra note 235, at 119 (explaining that substantial wealth disparities mean
that "there are great riches within view but not within reach of many people destined to live in
poverty ....

[causing] resentment, frustration, hopelessness and alienation" among the poor).

238. See Julie L. Crouch & Joel S. Milner, Effects of Child Neglect on Children, 20 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 49, 51 (1993); Delgado, supra note 236, at 27-28, 33.
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As alluded to above, racial minority groups are also
disproportionality targeted by sections of the criminal justice system. A
2011 review of data from multiple studies found that police are more
inclined to arrest suspects from racial minorities than white suspects.239
This disparity in arrests is especially apparent in relation to drug
offenses, with more black people arrested than white people despite their
comparable or even lower rate of commission of such crimes.240
Between 1980 and 2007, across America, black people were arrested on
drug charges at rates between 2.8 to 5.5 times higher than white people
relative to their respective populations. 2 4 1 Empirical evidence exposes in
particular that, although white Americans use marijuana at the same or
even higher rates than black people, African Americans and Latinos are
more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than whites.242
Various factors may explain these disproportionate arrests. In addition to
the more intense policing of black neighborhoods than of predominantly
white areas, and consequent discovery of more crimes committed by
people from racial minorities than by whites, implicit racial bias can
affect police decisions about whom to arrest.24' For instance, research
has shown that, even if they have not committed offenses, people from
racial minorities disproportionately exhibit the nonverbal cues that
police officers often rely on to identify suspects. 24

239.

Task Force on Race & the Criminal Justice Sys., supra note 226, at 642 (quoting Tammy

Rinehart Kochel et al., Effect of Suspect Race on Officers'ArrestDecisions, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 473,

475, 480, 490 (2011)).
240. Paul Butler, Starr Is to Clinton as Regular ProsecutorsAre to Blacks, 40 B.C. L. REV.
705, 708-09 & n.16 (1999) (citing MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS
AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 9-10 (1995)).
241. Decades of Disparity: Drug Arrests and Race in the United States, HUM. RTs. WATCH

(Mar. 2, 2009),

https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/03/02/decades-disparity/drug-arrests-and-race-

united-states.
242. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 19-

21 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/fielddocument/11 14413-mj-report-rfs-rell.pdf
(finding that, as of 2013, on average, black people are 3.73 times more likely to be arrested for
marijuana possession than white people, although they use marijuana at similar rates throughout

&

America); see Howell, supra note 225, at 297, 321 & n.198, 322-24; KOHLER-HAUSMANN
FELLNER, supra note 211 (noting that the rates of marijuana use in New York City do not differ
significantly, but white people have slightly higher rates than non-Hispanic blacks); Davis, supra
note 225, at 30; Task Force on Race & the Criminal Justice Sys., supra note 226, at 651-52
(explaining that in Seattle the rate of arrests of black people for selling serious drugs other than
marijuana is 21 times higher than the rate of arrests of white people for the same offense, despite the
fact that several sources indicate that most sellers and users of serious drugs in Seattle are white).
243. Task Force on Race & the Criminal Justice Sys., supra note 226, at 666 ("The racial
component of a given case may influence judgments of character and guilt, expectations of
recidivism, and decisions to arrest and charge.").
244. Id. at 667; see also Robin S. Engel & Richard Johnson, Toward a Better Understandingof
Racial and Ethnic Disparitiesin Search and Seizure Rates, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 605, 610-12 (2006).
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Studies have also found that prosecutors are more likely to file and
proceed with charges against black suspects than white suspects, even
when their criminal records are identical. 245 Although police officers are
responsible for arresting more black people than white people,
prosecutors have substantial, largely unregulated, and unreviewable
discretion about whether to charge those arrested with crimes, and if so,
how many crimes to charge, and which offenses to charge.2 46
Prosecutors may decide to charge the many minor offenses for which
black people are arrested because they wish to avoid offending the
police officers with whom they must work, 247 and they lack the time and
resources to analyze relevant evidence.248 Importantly, while prosecutors
cite race-neutral factors as reasons for their decisions, implicit racial bias
and racial stereotypes may also heavily influence their exercise of
discretion to prosecute black people in relation to minor and more
serious offenses, rather than to dismiss such cases. 249 Research
demonstrates that many Americans unconsciously assume that African
Americans are dangerous, and associate them with criminality. 250
Prosecutors may therefore be more inclined to charge African American
suspects with violent offenses.251 Prosecutors might also, without
realizing it, deem offenses to be more serious and decide to proceed with
charges if the suspect is black and the victim is white than vice versa.252
Moreover, it is easier for prosecutors to substantiate charges at trial if
suspects have criminal records and, due to the high policing and rate of
arrests of black people, they are more likely to have prior convictions
than white people.253
245. Task Force on Race & the Criminal Justice Sys., supra note 226, at 647; see also Robert J.
Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial

Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 806-08 (2012) (quoting Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L.
Pierce, Race and ProsecutorialDiscretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 587, 591-92,

599, 601, 603-06, 609 (1985) (demonstrating that prosecutors in Florida charged white and black
defendants differently in homicide cases)).
246.

See Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The Role of the

Prosecutor, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202, 205-06 (2007); Howell, supra note 225, at 298-99,
305-06; Peter Krug, ProsecutorialDiscretionand Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L., Fall 2002, at 643,
645-49; Smith & Levinson, supranote 245, at 805, 810.
247. Howell, supra note 225, at 312 & n.157.
248. Id. at 313.
249. See Davis, supra note 246, at 206; see also Davis, supra note 225, at 34-38; Kristin N.
Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color: The Role of
Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 429 (2013); Smith & Levinson,

supra note 245, at 806-13.
250. Smith & Levinson, supra note 245, at 798; Task Force on Race & the Criminal Justice
Sys., supranote 226, at 665-66.
251. Smith & Levinson, supranote 245, at 808.
252. See Davis, supranote 225, at 35; Davis, supra note 246, at 207.
253. Davis, supra note 225, at 36-37.
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Having been arrested and charged, due to racial discrimination,
people from racial minorities are more likely to be convicted and receive
harsher sanctions than white people for the same offenses.2 54 African
Americans are imprisoned at more than six times the rate at which white
Americans are imprisoned.2 55 Moreover, according to a particularly
wide-ranging study that surveyed over 59,000 offenders who received
sentences, black defendants are twenty-two percent more likely to
receive longer prison terms than white offenders who have committed
the same crimes and have identical criminal histories. 256 Likewise, a
study undertaken for the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics and the U.S.
Department of Justice Working Group on Racial Disparity found that, in
the federal jurisdiction between 2005 and 2012, judges imposed prison
sentences on black men that were approximately five to ten percent
longer than those imposed on white offenders for similar offenses.2 57
During that period, courts had considerable discretion regarding
sentencing because, as noted above, in 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court
held in United States v. Booker that the Guidelines were advisory
rather than mandatory. 2 58 While the report for this study notes that it
is "difficult to attribute racial disparity to skin color alone,"259 it
also comments:
We are concerned that racial disparity has increased over time since
Booker. Perhaps judges, who feel increasingly emancipated from their
guidelines restrictions, are improving justice administration by
incorporating relevant but previously ignored factors into their
254. Rose Matsui Ochi, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing, in CONTINUING THE
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: 100 YEARS OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
193, 193-96 (Barry Krisberg et al. eds., 2007).
255. HEATHER C. WEST ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
NCJ 231675, BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2009, at 9 (2010), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pO9.
pdf; see PRISON REFORM TR., BROMLEY BRIEFINGS PRISON FACTFILE 35 (2012), http://www.

thebromleytrust.org.uk/Indexhibit/files/BromleyBriefingsJune20l2.pdf

(stating that in the United

Kingdom the number of racial minorities in prison is greater than in the United States); see also

HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 241 ("Human Rights Watch's analysis of prison admission data for
2003 revealed that relative to population, blacks are 10.1 times more likely than whites to be
imprisoned for drug offenses.").
256. Ronald S. Everett & Roger Wojtkiewicz, Diference, Disparity, and Race/Ethnic Bias in
FederalSentencing, 18 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 189, 195-96, 199-200, 207 (2002); see also
David S. Abrams et al., Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment ofRace?, 41 J. LEGAL STUDS. 347, 351-

52, 356 (2012).
257. William Rhodes et al., FederalSentencing Disparity: 2005-2012, at 51-54, 56 (Bureau
of Justice Statistics, Working Paper Series No.2015:01, 2015). This report also systematically
documents previous studies done in the United States that support the conclusion that subconscious
bias causes racial disparity in sentencing. Id. at 7-15.

258.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005); see supra notes 74-75 and

accompanying text.

259.

See Rhodes et al., supranote 257, at 67.
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sentencing calculus, even if this improvement disadvantages black
males as a class. But in a society that sees intentional and unintentional
racial bias in many areas of social and economic activity, these trends
are a warning sign. It is further distressing that judges disagree about
the relative sentences for white and black males because those
disagreements cannot be so easily explained by sentencing-relevant
factors that vary systematically between black and white
males... . We take the random effect as strong evidence of disparity in
260
the imposition of sentences for white and black males.
Other studies have also found that heavier penalties have been
imposed on black offenders who harmed white victims than on offenders
who harmed black victims, which the authors concluded was attributable
to the notion that because "the judges were also White . .. their in-group
or worldview was more threatened by criminal conduct against persons
from their in-group."261
To reduce the impact of the punitive attitude to criminal justice, and
therefore make it more likely that evidence-based reform of the
sentencing system can occur, it is vital to acknowledge and then attempt
to thwart the racist aspects of its operation. While it is beyond the scope
of this Article to discuss economic and social measures that would
improve many African Americans' low socio-economic status, some
immediate concrete reforms can be implemented to ameliorate the
disproportionate punitive burden that the sentencing system imposes
on racial minorities, which would make some progress towards
greater social and economic equality in the United States. These
recommendations, if adopted, will not eliminate all of the unfair burdens
experienced by African American offenders.262 Nevertheless, they would
260. Id. at 68. Recently it has been suggested that predictive tools used to assess future
criminality are biased against black Americans. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There's
Software Used Across the Country to PredictFuture Criminals. And It's Biased Against Blacks,

PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-incriminal-sentencing; see also Joe Palazzolo, Wisconsin Supreme Court to Rule on Predictive
Algorithms Used in Sentencing, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2016, 5:30 AM), http://www.wsj.com/

articles/wisconsin-supreme-court-to-rule-on-predictive-algorithms-used-in-sentencing-1465119008
(stating that the legality of the use of algorithms to predict the likelihood of criminal conduct is
being challenged in Wisconsin).
261. Siegfried L. Sporer & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Disparities in Sentencing Decisions, in
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT ON CRIME 379, 390 (Margit E. Oswald et al. eds., 2009).
Further, African Americans and Latinos are over-represented in solitary confinement when

compared to the general prison population. Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, The Link Between Race and
Solitary Confinement, ATLANTIC (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/

12/race-solitary-confinement/509456.
262. For an example in the context of indigenous Australian communities, see LAW
COUNCIL OF AUSTL., INQUIRY INTO ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER EXPERIENCES
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUSTICE SERVICES 5-7, 11, 16 (2015), https://www.lawcouncil.asn.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

43

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

828

[Vol. 45:785

decrease the suffering experienced by African Americans as a
consequence of sentencing, and could act as a catalyst for the
implementation of other changes to the criminal justice system that
would further reduce this burden.
To overcome the disproportionate punitive burden that the
sentencing system has inflicted on African American offenders, a
number of changes are necessary. The first is obvious: the community
needs to be encouraged to accept the reality that racial prejudice
underpins many of the harsh penalties that are now a feature of
sentencing law in the United States. This will lead to a more critical
assessment of such provisions.
One of the authors has previously argued that there are two other
essential reforms that are necessary to redress the additional suffering
experienced by African Americans as compared to white people in the
current sentencing system. 263 First, African Americans should receive a
discounted penalty in the order of twenty-five percent when they are
sentenced for all offenses except serious sexual and violent offenses.
The often devastating effects of serious sexual and violent offenses on
the lives of victims,

26 4

plus the fact that all people (no matter how poor)

are aware of the heinous nature of such crimes, militates against a
sentencing discount for these types of offenses. The calculus is
differently weighted regarding other forms of offenses, such as drug and
property offenses. Once the suffering associated with violent and sexual
injuries is removed from the equation, the stricture and pain of poverty is
paramount and should be reflected in a twenty-five percent sentencing
reduction for African American offenders who commit such crimes.
Further, there should be a considerable reduction in the aggravating
effect of prior convictions. Prior convictions can often result in a
massive increase in penalty, even more than a decade in prison. There is
no jurisprudential or normative justification for this approach. Poor
African American offenders are disproportionality affected by this unfair
sentencing enhancement because they have more prior convictions, and
au/lawcouncil/images/2994_-S_-_submissionatsi experience-of lawenforcement andjustice
services.pdf (discussing the problems associated with the over-policing of Indigenous communities
and inadequate legal and interpreter services); and see also JUST REINVEST N.S.W., SUBMISSION
TO INQUIRY INTO ACCESS TO LEGAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES 3, 6-7 (2015), http://www.

aph.gov.au/documentstore.ashx?id=cb97b4c9-d6e8-46a2-9beO-89f9bab6565b&subld=350666;
and
Wayne Martin, CJ, WA Sup. Ct., Address at the University of Western Australia Conference:
Law Summer School (2015), http://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/files/speechesindigenous
incarceration rates.pdf.
263. Bagaric, Rich Offender, Poor Offender, supra note 114, at 29-44; see Bagaric, Three
Things, supra note 114 (manuscript at 33-41).
264. Bagaric, Rich Offender, PoorOffender, supranote 114, at 37-39.
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hence, it is a clear case of indirect discrimination. They would benefit
most from the abolition of a recidivist loading or at least a significant
reduction in the weight that is placed on prior criminality in the
sentencing calculus. To that end, as noted above, the recidivist loading
should be abolished in relation to all sexual and violent offenders, where
a much reduced enhancement should apply, in the order of twenty
percent to fifty percent. This would considerably reduce the rate and
duration of prison terms imposed on poor African Americans.
In addition to these recommendations, greater attention needs to be
paid to the unfair policing and prosecution practices that target African
Americans disproportionately, and sentencing judges, prosecutors, and
law enforcement officials should undergo subconscious bias training.
2. The Crime Wave Between 1960 and 1980
While race remains a singularly important determinant of American
punitive attitudes to criminal justice, the long-term effects of the crime
wave between 1960 and 1980 have also greatly influenced them. As
Gopnik has stated, "the real background to the prison boom . . [was] the
crime wave that preceded and overlapped it." 2 65 Recognizing that "the
big-city crime wave of the sixties and seventies" 266 may now appear
"like mere bogeyman history" 267 to "those too young to recall" 268 it, he
has also asserted, "for those whose entire childhood and adolescence
were set against it," 2 6 9 this escalation in violent crime was "the crucial
trauma in recent American life and explains much else that happened in
the same period." 27 0
National crime rates began to increase significantly in 1961 and
continued to rise until 1981.271 While panic about other episodes of
rising (real or perceived) criminal activity had previously marked
American society and politics, these prior concerns had not created such
sustained concern or lasting and comprehensive legal consequences. As
the National Research Council has noted, a complex range of factors
contributed to the singular effect that crime had on criminal justice
policy from the 1960s onwards.272 As the Council puts it, "[c]ertain
features of the social, political, and institutional context" 273 of the 1960s
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Gopnik, supranote 56.
Id.
Id
Id
Id
Id

271.

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supranote 6, at 111.

272. Id. at 104-06, 109-11, 113-15, 118-28.
273. Id. at 111.
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led "politicians, policy makers, and other public figures" 2 74 to respond to
crime in ways that "entailed embracing harsher policies rather than
emphasizing other remedies,"275 and that inflamed "public fears of crime
even after crime rates had ceased to increase."2 76
The responses to rising crime rates that developed during this
period were crucial to the creation of current rates of incarceration.
Although President Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" policy program
waged "war on poverty" and concentrated, to some extent, on the "root
causes" of crime, it resulted not so much in greater investment in
education, health, welfare, and other essential services as in greatly
enlarged policing powers and resources.277 In 1965, Congress passed the
Law Enforcement Assistance Act.2 78 This Act, which established the
Office of Law Enforcement Assistance, began an era of unprecedented
federal government involvement in law enforcement.279 Soon after, the
findings of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice led Congress to pass the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act ("Safe Streets Act") in 1968.280 The
"liberal" features of this Act, including "federal grants to police for
equipment, training, and pilot programs and also greater federal
investments in rehabilitation, crime prevention, and alternatives to
incarceration," were all but cancelled by measures giving state
governments great discretion in the disbursement of federal money, as
well as "provisions on wiretapping, confessions, and use of eyewitnesses
that curtailed the procedural protections that had been extended by
[recent] Supreme Court decisions."281
America's so-called "war on drugs," announced by President
Richard Nixon in 1971, also contributed greatly to incarceration rates.2 82
Federal and state anti-drug laws enacted or revised in this period resulted
in unprecedented imprisonment rates for the use and possession of
prohibited substances. By 1997, around one-fifth of all state inmates and
almost two-thirds of federal prisoners were imprisoned for drug

274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 109-10.
278. Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-197, 79 Stat. 828 (repealed
1968); see NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supranote 6, at 110.
279. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 110.

280.

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197

(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); see NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 6, at 110.
281. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 110-11.

282. Id. at 119-20.
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offenses.283 Subsequently, the proportion of state prisoners imprisoned
for drug offenses has remained at this level, while the proportion of
federal prisoners has slightly dropped to a still extraordinary (by
international standards) fifty percent. 284
Punitive anti-drug laws were just one form of punitive state
criminal justice laws that were promulgated in the 1980s. Also, the Safe
Streets Act was amended by the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994,285 which has been described as the "largest
single piece of criminal justice legislation in history" and has "provided
financial incentives for states to expand police departments, pass toughon-crime sentencing laws, and build prisons." 286 State legislatures
enacted "so-called truth-in-sentencing reforms designed to ensure that
offenders spent more of their sentence behind bars." 287 Simultaneously,
"[s]tates also curtailed or even abolished parole, established mandatory
minimum sentences, and passed three strikes-type laws that required
especially stiff penalties for repeat offenders." 288
The Safe Streets Act and some anti-drug legislation coincided with
the growth in violent crime rates.289 Yet, subsequent legislation did not,
including the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.290 By
this time, however, American lawmakers were operating in a political
environment, forged in the 1960s, where "the law-and-order issue
became a persistent tripwire stretching across national and local politics
[that] politicians and policy makers increasingly chose to trigger . .. as
they sought support for more punitive policies and for expansion of the
institutions and resources needed to make good on promises to 'get
tough. "'291 And the disjunction between crime rates after 1980 and the
ever-harsher responses to them did not represent a break with more
justifiable responses in the 1960s and 1970s. For, even then, "tough on
crime" laws, the National Research Council argues, were the result of
"political choices not determined by the direction in which the crime rate
was moving" but rather by a generation of political "candidates and
office-holders" who exploited a "lack of political consensus" on the
283. Id. at 120.
284. Id.
285. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796, 1807 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
286. MUENSTER & TRONE, supranote 108, at 13.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supranote 6, at 110-12.
290. See Erik Eckholm, PrisonRate Was Rising Years Before 1994 Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
2016, at A9.
291.
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causes of and effective remedies to the increase in violent crime, and the
public alarm that this lack of consensus caused.292
The elevation and sustenance of crime as a political issue was
contingent on perennial, substantial features of American politics and
society. One was partisanship. The Republican Party rebuilt its electoral
popularity on its "tough on crime" credentials, particularly in the South,
which had essentially been a Democratic protectorate since the Civil
War. 293 Barry Goldwater's presidential campaign of 1964 had "sought
white electoral support through explicit and implicit race-based appeals
and denunciations of the civil rights movement" that were expressed as
harsh criminal justice measures. 294 As Southern and Northern Democrats
fought over how to respond to the civil rights movement, Republicans
developed "political strategies that used the crime issue to appeal
to white racial anxieties." 295 Their "Southern" strategy advanced
Goldwater's ostensibly unsuccessful strategy and saw them make
"racially coded appeals to woo southern and working-class white
voters."2 9 6 As top Nixon aide Harold Robbins Haldeman later explained,
while Nixon and his heirs believed "the whole problem [was] really the
blacks," with respect to crime, they also learned it was crucial "to devise
a system that recognizes this while not appearing to." 29 7
There was considerable precedent in recent and more antique
American history for such partisanship. The Red Scare of the 1940s and
1950s was, in significant part, a political beat-up exploited by a
Republican leadership furious in 1948 with having lost a fifth
consecutive presidential election. 2 98 Charges leveled by Republicans
against the Truman Administration for being "soft on communism" were
echoed twenty years later in Republican claims that Democratic policies
of easing punishments constituted misguided social welfare policy that
was "soft on crime. "299
Yet these charges only stuck, and had electoral appeal, because
Democrats and their constituency also rejected the prospect of true racial
integration at a community and street level. As the National Research
Council states, the "social, political, and economic pressures that [both]
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. at 111.
Id. at 104, 112, 119-20.
Id. at 108.
Id at 113, 115.
Id at 115.

297. Id. at 116 (quoting H. R. HALDEMAN, THE HALDEMAN DIARIES: INSIDE THE NIXON
WHITE HOUSE 53 (1994)).
298. NICK FISCHER, SPIDER WEB: THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN ANTICOMMUNISM 200-03 (2016)

(discussing partisanship during the Cold War).
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northern and southern whites felt from the Second Great Migration"" 0
of African Americans from the South to northern and Pacific industrial
centers led the Johnson Administration to emphasize the enhancement of
"law enforcement and professionalizing the police" at the expense of
strengthened "investments in cities and social programs to mitigate the
31
stresses and strains of the Great Migration."o
While "many urban white
voters" were prepared to support "national pro-civil rights candidates,"
they were "personally concerned over and often opposed to residential
integration at the local level."302 So, in short, age-old concepts of
"racial" unity created the common platform for a bipartisan consensus
on the need for strong responses to the crime rates that coincided with a
period of great social change.
Again, this race-based response to such change was not
unprecedented. The National Research Council contrasts the "tough on
crime" policy unity of the major parties since 1965 with the response of
progressives in the early twentieth century to "white criminality in urban
areas," which they argued was "rooted primarily in the strains of
industrial capitalism and urban life."303 Thus, the Council argues that
"policy makers, legislators, and social activists in the Progressive era
sought to ameliorate those strains by pressing for greater public and
private investments in education, social services, social programs, and
public infrastructure in urban areas with high concentrations of
European immigrants."30 4 Yet this analysis entirely ignores the
substantial conservative backlash to immigration that culminated in the
passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, which revolutionized
immigration policy, instituting for the first time restrictive "national
origins" quotas for arbitrarily defined ethnic groups that white-washed
immigration for the next forty years.305 In times of great political and
social stress, race has proven to be a perennial and preponderant basis
for public policy.30 6
While the crime wave in the period from 1960 to 1980 has been a
significant cause of punitive attitudes to criminal justice, crime rates are
no longer high, so there is no need to address this factor to tackle the
current incarceration crisis. Nevertheless, in highlighting that current

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 109.
Id. at 109-10.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 113.
Id.
See FISCHER, supra note 299, at 114-15, 117-18, 121-23.
See id. at 113-27 (discussing the history of the Immigration Act of 1924).
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crime rates are low, this history helps justify the introduction of more
moderate sentencing laws today.
3. The Progressive Roots of the "Tough on Crime" Agenda
The influence of race is crucial to understanding why the "liberal"
and Democratic criminal justice reforms that followed the Second World
War in no way challenged fundamental premises about the racial origins
and associations of crime. This would prove decisive in the rise of
"tough on crime" policies associated with the crime boom of the 1960s.
Liberal criminal justice reforms of the period, typically emanating
from northern and urban areas, were thoroughly and traditionally
"progressive" in their rationales, implementation, and effects. In simple
terms, the reforms of the 1940s to 1960s were technocratic, seeking to
professionalize and standardize the administration of justice. In equally
simple terms, its proponents tended to assume that procedural fairness
was the key to producing just outcomes.
Beginning in the 1940s, liberal reformers strove to enlarge the
federal government's role in criminal justice.30 7 The Truman
Administration prioritized "uniformity, neutrality, and proceduralism in
law enforcement and sentencing," to improve criminal justice outcomes,
particularly for defendants from minority groups.308 Together with the
legal profession and the U.S. Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl
Warren, the federal government focused on eliminating "discretion and
arbitrary power," which were particularly associated with southern states
and local authorities.309 The Warren Court handed down a series of
judgments "expanding the procedural rights of suspects, defendants and
prisoners," and the American Legal Institute devised the Model Penal
Code to guide sentencing policy.3" 0 Reformers hoped that these "greater
procedural protections" would make the "criminal justice system more
legitimate in the eyes of minority groups," and thereby "eliminate a main
source of protests and political discontent" among social groups "that
did not view the system as fair and legitimate."31 1
The equation of federal authority with objective application of the
law, however, was itself problematic. The major source of national
crime figures, from 1930 until 1973, for example, was the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports ("UCR").3 12 Initially
307.

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 107-08.
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310.
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gathered to buttress the Bureau's image and enlarge its influence, the
reports were infused with the biases of its dictatorial and virulently racist
boss, J. Edgar Hoover.313 Thus, as the National Research Council
diplomatically states, "[i]t does appear that the UCR data exaggerated
the extent and duration of the crime increase [of the 1960s] for certain
offense categories," 314 which were readily associated with racial
minorities. Further, the data were not even produced so much as
doctored by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 15 The data
underpinning the UCR was actually submitted by local police
departments, and then "often systematically skewed in recording and
reporting, due in part to incentives to record more crime in order to
receive more government funding to combat crime."3 16
The perversion of criminal justice policy by ambitious bureaucrats
looking to expand the size and power of their agencies was widespread.
Another empire-building official, Harry Anslinger, who was the head of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics ("FBN") (a forerunner of the current
Drug Enforcement Administration) from 1930 to 1962, saw in marijuana
and heroin an opportunity to redirect federal government efforts to
prohibit the consumption of substances associated with racial
minorities. 3 17 With the great alcohol prohibition experiment ending
ignominiously, Anslinger elevated the threat in the public mind of illicit
substances that were carefully associated with Mexicans, Chinese, and
African Americans.3 Thus, over several decades, Anslinger not only
built up a formidable agency, but he also influenced drug policy away
from therapeutic, health-based approaches toward heavy criminal
penalties for people involved, no matter how innocuously, in the drug
trade. The great bulk of people criminalized by drug addiction were, of
course, racial minorities.31 9 Whereas the great jazz singer Billie Holiday
was literally harassed to death by the FBN, white stars such as Judy
Garland were given a sympathetic hearing, and shielded from
professional and social consequences of their addiction.3 2 0 By the time
then-President Nixon declared his "war on drugs," largely to deflect
BRIEF CRITICAL HISTORY 35-36 (2004).
313. See FISCHER, supra note 299, at 226; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 114.
314. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 114.
315. Id at12,114&nn.10-11.
316. Id. at 114. For how Hoover's racism perverted Bureau operations see FISCHER, supra note
299, at 70, 226, 248.
317. JOHANN HARI, CHASING THE SCREAM: THE FIRST AND LAST DAYS OF THE WAR ON
DRUGS 10-11, 15-19, 26-28 (2015).

318. Id. at 14-17.
319.
320.

See id. at 15-17, 26-27.
Id. at 18, 22-26, 28-32.
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attention from the disastrous course of the Vietnam War, the racist
application of criminal drug policy, which has channeled millions of
prisoners into American prisons, had been established for nearly
fifty years.321
Mid-century criminal justice reformers were prevented from
detecting problems inherent in equating federal authority and
standardized procedure with fundamental justice by the legacy of the
Progressive tradition in American social policy. Arising in the last years
of the nineteenth century, the Progressive movement comprised an
informal and loose coalition of reform causes led by middle-class and
professional white citizens (from northern European backgrounds).
Although these reformers "admitted there was much wrong with
America," they still "saw little that could not be mended using
governmental authority and scientific efficiency." 322 As they saw it, they
were working to rebirth a "managed republic in which men of talent and
training guided the affairs of a prosperous people."3 23 Progressives
shunned any notion that any action by citizens or government "should
alter the fundamental structures of social power and property" in
America. Progressives tended to regard "[n]ew immigrants and African
Americans . . . as dependent peoples [that] merited charitable attention

[and] even concerted education," but who were essentially "incapable of
constructive group activity on their own behalf."324
According to historian Shelton Stromquist, "[p]rogressivism
figured into the reform equations of succeeding decades in ambiguous
ways," including a "propensity of reformers to look to the state and
dispassionate experts for the solutions to social problems."325 President
Johnson's "war on poverty" was the last gasp of the Progressive
tradition, and the criminal justice initiatives of the Johnson and
Eisenhower Administrations can profitably be seen as examples of the
Progressive reluctance to examine and change the deeper power
structures and social beliefs that can frustrate the capacity of even the
most enlightened processes and administrators to deliver fundamental
justice to society's less fortunate.32 6 Although liberals in the 1950s and
321.

Emily Dufton, The War on Drugs: How President Nixon Tied Addiction to Crime,

ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-war-on-drugs-

how-president-nixon-tied-addiction-to-crime/254319.
322. John L. Thomas, The ProgressiveImpulse, in THE GREAT REPUBLIC: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 596 (3d ed. 1985).

323.
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324. See SHELTON STROMQUIST, REINVENTING "THE PEOPLE": THE PROGRESSIVE
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1960s reasoned that their criminal justice reforms "would yield racial
fairness and thus reduce political unrest and crime among minority
groups,"327 they did not appreciate the extent to which the application of
their measures might founder on the rock of entrenched racial attitudes.
In order to dilute the impact of the Progressive reform tradition on
sentencing law, it is important to understand that while procedural
regularity and fairness are important (indeed they are central premises
underlying many of the reforms proposed in this Article), fairly applied
procedures alone are insufficient to ensure the efficient and just
application of criminal justice policy. The root causes of punitive
attitudes also must be addressed. This is in part why evidence that
violent crime rates have been falling to historic lows has not resulted in
substantial reform to criminal justice policy. In order for sentencing to
evolve into a fairer and more efficient practice, the focus must move
from the implementation of procedural structures to an approach where
these procedures reflect acute understanding of the key factors that
influence crime, as well as policy objectives that can properly be
achieved through a system of state-based punishment.
4. Economic Crisis and Criminal Justice Policy
The rise in violent crime and imprisonment rates from the 1960s
accompanied major structural changes in the U.S. economy that were
extremely damaging to the economic and social prospects of the classes
of people who would come to inhabit America's grossly overpopulated
prisons in disproportionate numbers: namely undereducated manual
laborers from the working classes, many of whom hailed from minority
ethnic groups.
"The years 1967-68 . .. marked the end of a long run-up in annual

increases in profit" and signaled "the close of the golden age" of
American capitalism.3 28 America's manufacturing sector increasingly
began to lose markets to cheaper foreign labor and the financial sector
became the new command center of the U.S. economy.32 9 Labor unions
were now unable to protect their members' benefits, conditions, and
wages, and laborers found that they increasingly had no role and no
government structures to protect them.330
Prisons, as Ruth Wilson Gilmore notes, "are partial geographical
solutions to political economic crises."331 Crises create environments
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. at 110.
GILMORE, supranote 110, at 25.
Perry Anderson, Homeland, NEW LEFT REV., May/June 2013, at 5, 8-10.
Id. at 7-11.
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where instability "can be fixed only through radical measures, which
include developing new relationships and new or renovated institutions
out of what already exists." 332 And the economic and social crisis
striking the United States at "the end of the golden age of American
capitalism provides a [vital] key" to understanding the origins of
contemporary criminal justice policy. 333
As the National Research Council notes, "the decline of organized
labor and the contraction of well-paying manufacturing and other jobs in
urban areas for low-skilled workers" created "pockets of severe and
spatially concentrated poverty" where "contact with the criminal justice
system and incarceration rates climbed to extraordinary levels." 33 4
Whatever progress African Americans and others made through the civil
rights movement was undermined by "the decline of urban
manufacturing," which "undermined economic opportunities for those
with no more than a high school education," resulting in "growing racial
gaps in earnings and employment that extended from the mid-1970s to
the end of the 1980s." 33 5
When Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated, he and his
colleagues regarded the struggle for greater economic rights for
America's poorest citizens as their next great challenge.3 3 6 King's death,
however, led to "the eclipse of the 'poor peoples' campaign in 1968,"
and thereafter, the "explicit vocabulary of class receded" from view in
"the lexicon of liberal reform as the twentieth century wound down." 337
Meanwhile, socially conservative politicians heightened their
rhetorical and policy emphasis on being "tough on crime." As Gilmore
shows, California serves as a meaningful case study for the development
of national trends. 338 Among the politicians encouraging harsh criminal
justice policies, few were more significant than Nixon and Reagan. Both
were in office in the late 1960s, with Nixon as President and Reagan as
Governor of California. Then, during Reagan's tenure as President, from
1981 to 1989, he continued to greatly influence national criminal justice
policy. Although California's economy grew in the post-war era to
become the fifth or sixth-largest economy in the world, its poverty
rankings also rose dramatically, from thirtieth in 1980 to fourteenth in

332.
333.
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Id.

334.
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335.
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2001.339 Much of this inequality resulted from the evaporation of jobs
for the children of those African Americans who had migrated into
wartime industries and whose children from the 1960s onward could not
find equally well remunerated jobs.340 When the Summer of Love saw
"thousands of flower children [flock] to San Francisco to repudiate the
establishment, California lined up its anti-antiracist coercive forces
behind the vanguard Panther Gun Bill," targeting the radical black
political and activist collective, the Black Panthers, just as "the rate of
profit began its spectacular decline" and as California entered a deep,
nationally significant recession.341 Hence, as California's economy and
political structures were reconfigured, "power blocs rising from the
Sunbelt," including those fronted by Nixon and Reagan, "began to
propose 'law and order' as the appropriate response to domestic
insecurity, whatever its root causes."342
Thus, we can see that from the 1960s onwards, governments in the
United States have followed a reactive path of investing in punitive
criminal justice rather than more productive forms of social expenditure,
such as education, training, and broad economic restructuring. With the
United States enduring prolonged recession or flat growth for much of
the last ten years, and with disenchantment with economic policies of the
last thirty-five years at record levels, the time is ripe for fresh discussion
about the role of criminal justice systems in an economic context. Such a
context should encourage greater recognition that expenditure on
imprisonment is profoundly unproductive and unjust, and that it diverts
precious public resources away from productive services such as health,
education, and training.
5. The Privatization of Criminal Justice Policy
The sharp end of the connection between the criminal justice
system and misguided economic policy set out above is the massive
scale of the privatization of the corrections sector. The United States
houses by far the majority of the world's privately-run prisons and
associated corrections services.3 43 And while the profit motive may not
have been an initial impetus for the development of "tough on crime"
policies, these policies "over time . . created new economic interests

339.
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and new political configurations,"3 44 which have both fueled and
capitalized on punitive attitudes to criminal justice.
Journalist Robert Nelson has described prison privatization policy
as the "brain child of free-market economists."34 5 It is quintessential neoliberal economic policy: the outsourcing of previous government
monopolies justified by claims of economic efficiency and reduced
taxpayer burden.3 46 Further, as Yijia Jing puts it, prison privatization,
perhaps uniquely, "reconciles the conflict between the expansive role of
government in social control under social conservatism and the minimal,
non-intrusive role of the state across policy areas under neoliberalism."3 47 Privatized prisons ensure that "the state simultaneously
enhances its overall punishing capacity but reduces its role in the direct
administration of punishment."3 48
The extent of new economic and political configurations created by
prison privatization in the United States over the last thirty or so years
has prompted critics of privatization to decry the existence of a "prison
industrial complex."3 49 The principal players in this complex-major
corporations that run the prisons and associated services-have written
the laws that create their business since the 1980s, with the aid of
legislators to whom they have given generous donations and private
sector jobs.350 While prisoners have produced goods for over a hundred
years, prisoners were for many years barred from working for private
entities in order to protect private companies from unfair competition.3 51
This situation has since changed markedly due to lobbying by the
American Legislative Exchange Council ("ALEC"), which wrote and
sponsored the Federal Prison Industries Act ("PIA") to greatly expand
the Prison Industries Enhancement Certification Program ("PIE").352
The PIE was created by Congress in 1979 "to encourage states
and .. . local government to establish employment opportunities for
prisoners that approximate private sector work opportunities."35 3 Until
the mid-1990s, few states participated in the program. Then, under the
344. Id.
345. Robert Nelson, Big House Inc., PHX. NEW TIMES (Apr. 3, 2003, 4:00 AM), http://www.
phoenixnewtimes.com/news/big-house-ine-6433263.
346. Anderson, supra note 329, at 9-11.
347.
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(2010).
348. Id at xviii-xix.
349. Mike Elk & Bob Sloan, The Hidden History ofALEC and PrisonLabor, NATION (Aug. 1,
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influence of ALEC, which had already been instrumental in the
introduction of mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders and
"three strikes" laws, dozens of states began to introduce "truth in
sentencing" acts, and greatly expand their PIEs.354 Key legislators
backing this expansion included Texas State Representative and ALEC
member Ray Allen, who "crafted the Texas Prison Industries Act" to
expand the PIE in Texas. 55 Allen eventually rose to become Chair of the
Texas House Corrections Committee and simultaneously was Chair of
ALEC's Criminal Justice Task Force (later the Public Safety and
Elections Task Force).3 56 Allen resigned from the legislature in 2006,
while being investigated for unethical lobbying and became a lobbyist
for Geo Group, formerly Wackenhut Corrections, one of the two largest
private prison firms in the United States.357
According to Jing, lobbyists gave birth to the idea of prison
privatization in the mid-1980s.m This represented an extension of
service contracting in state prisons (for health care and food services)
that private firms had already been meeting. Between 1986 and 2000,
"an average of [seventeen] new private prisons entered the marketplace
annually."35 9 By 1996, more than 50,000 prisoners worldwide were held
in private prisons and the United States "accounted for 92% of it." 36 0
By 2003, 5.7% of state prisoners in the United States were held in
private prisons. 36 1 In just one state, California, 23 major new prisons
were built between 1984 and 2007 at a cost of $280 to $350 million
each.362 California had built only 12 prisons between 1852 and 1964.363
Interestingly, private prisons are also an Anglophone phenomenon. In
2002, only Australia, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Canada, and
New Zealand had private prisons.364 The Anglosphere has also formed
the heart of the neo-liberal consensus.
Under the aegis of ALEC, the PIE has also been transformed into a
virtual slave labor system. The PIE initially authorized the employment
of inmate labor under various conditions, including the payment of
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inmates at "prevailing wage rate."3 6 5 Further, "room and board
deductions" from prisoners' pay were required to be "reasonable
and .. . used to defray the cost of inmate incarceration." 3 6 6 The PIA,
however, changed these conditions by creating a "'private sector prison
industry expansion account' to absorb such deductions," and making
legal the use of such money for the construction of work facilities, the
recruitment of corporations to participate in private sector program
provision, and the payment of the costs of implementing these
programs.3 67 "Thus, money that was taken from inmate wages to offset
the costs of incarceration" was redirected to fund the expansion of the
private prison industry.36 8 In some states, notably Florida, a PIE loophole
was exploited to imply that rules applying to the use of prison labor were
inapplicable to prisoner-manufactured goods that were not shipped
interstate.3 69 This permitted third-party companies to establish addresses
in states where prisoners made goods, and buy those goods to then sell
them locally or interstate.37 0 Such activity was made possible, in part, by
the transfer of oversight of PIE from the Department of Justice to "a
private trade organization that happened to be represented by [Ray]
Allen's lobbying firm, Service House, Inc."371
The effects of these practices are widespread and devastating. In the
broader economy, prison labor undercuts the viability of corporations
that do not use it. In Florida, where there were forty-one prison
industries in 2011, large prison contractors ran small printing operations
out of business.372 Other states replaced public sector workers with
prison labor. When he was the Republican Governor of Wisconsin, Scott
Walker permitted the use of prisoners in public sector jobs where
inmates performed landscaping, painting, and maintenance work.373
These prisoners were not paid but instead given reduced sentences.37 4
Identical practices occurred in Virginia, Ohio, New Jersey, Florida, and
Georgia, states with Republican assembly majorities and governors.3 75
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These politicians effectively revived hard labor with time off for good
behavior as legal punishment in their states.376
Prison privatization has also given rise to profiteering, reduced
safety for guards and inmates, the payment of "sub-poverty wages for
employees and political scandals." 377 In Florida, Correctional Services
Corporation ("CSC"), the largest private prison provider in America,
has been linked to "a litany of guard abuse and inmate escapes," but
was also "holding inmates past their release dates so the company
could collect more per diem dollars from the state."37 8 Private prisons
on average:
* Operate only one percent cheaper than publicly owned prisons, but
only because they pay atrocious wages to staff.
* Record forty-nine percent more assaults on staff and sixty-six
percent higher inmate-on-inmate assaults.
* Record an employee turnover rate of fifty-three percent per annum
compared with sixteen percent in public prisons (private prisons
completely turn over their staff every two years).
* Record one escape per 489 inmates compared with one per 14,601
inmates in public prisons.
* Offer guards thirty-five percent less pre-service training hours. 7
Private prisons ceased reporting salary information in 2000, when
beginning employees on average were paid 23.4% less than public
employees, and employees at the top of the salary scale were paid 39.4%
less.380 Private prisons are also scandalously insecure. Prisoners escape
from private facilities far more often and in greater numbers. Manhunts
of dangerous felons were reckoned to cost communities about $10,000
per day in police expenses in the mid-2000s.381 Dangerous felons in CSC
care escaped and killed people, and four convicted felons escaped from a
CSC facility in Youngstown, Ohio, because the medium-security facility
was holding more than 100 maximum-security prisoners.382 Private
companies actually benefit from prison escapes because when escapees
are caught they are given longer sentences. The costs for communities
also mount because, unlike in public prisons, guards in private facilities
are not protected from litigation under state and federal law, which
means that the costs of lawsuits are passed on to government. 383 One
376. Id.
377. Nelson, supra note 345.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
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Florida juvenile court judge compared CSC's Pahokee Youth
Department Center with a "Third World country that is controlled
by . . some type of evil power."38 4 In 1998, the Florida Department of
Juvenile Justice reported that "CSC had kept 10 juveniles 'beyond their
release dates for the sole purpose of making more money' and that
"CSC officials had issued a memorandum telling staff to hold teenagers
so they would be counted on the quarterly head count that determines
how much education and juvenile-justice money the company receives
from the state." 8 In 2001, the State of Maryland forced CSC to repay
$600,000 for failure to deliver contracted services after state officials
auditing the Victor Cullen Center "found chronic understaffing, a failing
education system, inadequate mental-health services and far too many
incidences of staff abuses of inmates."38 6
With such atrocious service and safety records, the tide has finally
begun to turn against privatized prisons. The Department of Justice
announced in August 2016 that it would either not renew the contracts
for private prison operators when they expire or would "substantially
reduce the contracts' scope," with a view ultimately to ending the federal
use of privately operated prisons.387
While such announcements represent an important change in
policy, sustained advocacy targeting America's fifty state governments
will be required to end the use of private prisons. The private prison
industry has vast resources, strong financial ties to myriad serving
legislators, and has been described as a "nimble political [actor]" in the
process of "repositioning [itself] to provide private probation, parole,
electronic monitoring, drug testing, counseling and other mandated
services." 8 The industry undoubtedly will rail against sentencing
changes that would markedly reduce the number of Americans
sentenced to prison. Nevertheless, any such protests must ultimately be
ignored as special pleading.
B. Failureto Articulate the Content of the ProportionalityPrinciple
In addition to the social and economic factors that generated and
fueled the "tough on crime" agenda, which has led to the current mass
incarceration crisis, a jurisprudential failing has allowed harsh sentences
384. Id
385. Id.
386. Id
387. Matt Zapotosky & Chico Harlan, Justice Department Says It Will End Use of Private
Prisons, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/
2016/08/18/justice-department-says-it-will-end-use-of-private-prisons/?utmterm=.8526e7f76d83.
388. MUENSTER & TRONE, supra note 108, at 31.
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to be implemented in an untrammeled fashion. Properly applied, the
principle of proportionality could lead to a reduction in the imposition of
harsh sentences and the incarceration rate. Unfortunately, however, the
failure of legislators, judges, and scholars to clearly articulate the content
of the principle and factors that are relevant to it-according to some, its
current formulation is so vague as to be meaningless 38 9-is another
cause of current problems with the sentencing system.
While proportionality is ostensibly a sentencing consideration in
several American states, there is little convergence in sentences within
and between those jurisdictions because the principle is devoid of
content at present. 9 Proportionality is a requirement of ten states'
sentencing regimes,391 at least nine states have constitutional provisions
that prohibit excessive penalties or treatment, 392 and twenty-two states
have constitutional clauses that disallow cruel and unusual penaltiesand eight of those have a proportionate-penalty clause.3 93 Nevertheless, a
clear method of matching punishments to crimes has not yet been
established. As Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg observe, "virtually
no legal doctrines have been developed on how the gravity of harms can
be compared."3 94 Jesper Ryberg similarly notes that proportionality
"presupposes something which is not there, namely, some objective
measure of appropriateness between crime and punishment."3 95
Even in countries such as Australia, where the proportionality
principle is a core aspect of sentencing law in all jurisdictions, courts'
purported application of it has failed to reduce the severity of sanctions
or the incarceration rate because there has been no attempt to
exhaustively define factors that are relevant to it. The High Court of

389. JESPER RYBERG, THE
INVESTIGATION 59-94 (2004).

390.

ETHICS

OF PROPORTIONATE

PUNISHMENT:

A

CRITICAL

Id. The Supreme Court has held that proportionality is a component of the Eighth

Amendment, however, it only applies to stamp out "grossly disproportionate" sentences and, hence,

has proved to be feeble protection. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 21, 28, 30-31 (2003)
(quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980)) (upholding a twenty-five years to life in
prison sentence for shoplifting three golf clubs worth less than $1000). Moreover, Justice Scalia
noted that proportionality was a difficult concept. Id. at 31-32 (Scalia, J., concurring).
391.

Gregory S. Schneider, Note, Sentencing Proportionalityin the States, 54 ARIZ. L. REV.

241, 242 n.2, 250 (2012).
392. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN
AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 154 (2009).

393. Id.
394. Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard
Analysis, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1991).
395. RYBERG, supra note 389, at 184. For a discussion regarding the obscure proportionality
jurisprudence by the Supreme Court, see Perry L. Moriearty, Implementing Proportionality,50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 961, 972-85, 1006-07, 1013, 1019, 1022, 1024-26 (2017).
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Australia observed in Veen v The Queen (No. 1)396 and Veen v The
Queen (No. 2)397 that proportionality is the principal aim of sentencing
and its primacy cannot be displaced even by the goal of community
protection.39 8 The High Court further stated in Hoare v. The Queen39 9
that "a basic principle of sentencing law is that a sentence of
imprisonment imposed by a court should never exceed that which can be
justified as appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime
considered in the light of its objective circumstances."40 0 If this principle
had been applied appropriately, the rate of incarceration would
have dropped. Yet, it has in fact tripled in Australia in the last
three decades.401
For application of the proportionality principle to mitigate the mass
incarceration crisis, it is critical that legislatures and courts establish a
systematic, doctrinally sound means of ensuring that the harshness of the
sanction matches the seriousness of the offense. The method proposed in
this Article is to impose a sanction that adversely affects the interests of
the offender to the same extent as the crime adversely affected his or her
victim's interests.402 Recent attempts to identify and measure factors that
contribute to human well-being, as well as studies of the impact of
different crimes on victims, can be deployed to assess the harm inflicted
by offenses and match sanctions to crimes proportionally.
Lawmakers could, for instance, refer to the "Better Life Index,"
developed by the OECD,40 3 in addition to research on the effects of
396. (1979) 143 CLR 458 (Austl.).
397. (1988) 164 CLR 465 (Austl.).
398. See, e.g., (1988) 164 CLR 465 (Austl.); (1979) 143 CLR 458, 467 (Austl.); Lovelock v.
The Queen (1978) 20 ALR 1, 5-6 (Austl.).
399. (1989) 167 CLR 348 (Austl.).
400. Id.
401. See Adam Graycar, Crime in the Twentieth Century Australia, in YEAR
BOOK AUSTRALIA 477, 485-88 (2001), http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/

7B268DE64F791420CA2569DF00012F05/$File/13010_2001.pdf; Press Release, Austl. Bureau of
Statistics, Australian Prisoner Numbers Reach 30,000 for the First Time (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.
abs.gov.au.
402. Mirko Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage That Is Proportionalityin Sentencing,

25 N.Z. U. L. REv. 411, 438 (2013). The proposed method bears some similarity to approaches of
other theorists, in particular, the notion of an "empirical desert." See Paul H. Robinson, The
Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARiz. ST. L.J.

1089, 1104-08 (2011) (discussing the principle's criteria). For further discussion on using an
interests analysis to estimate the severity of crimes, which is similar to a living standard analysis
for gauging crime seriousness, see von Hirsch, supra note 394, at 7-16; and see also ANDREW
ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 97

(2d ed.

1995) (recommending

that

proportionality at the outer limits "excludes punishments which impose far greater hardships on the
offender than does the crime on victims and society in general").
403.
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particular crimes on victims, to determine sanctions that are
proportionate to different offenses. The Better Life Index includes the
following criteria for assessing individuals' quality of life, ordered from
most to least important: life satisfaction, health, education, work-life
balance, environment, jobs, safety, housing, community, income, and
civic engagement.4 04 It also nominates the key interests that are vital to
attaining life satisfaction as being rights to life, physical integrity,
liberty, and property.40 5 This index is consistent with studies that have
found that property offenses, in depriving victims of wealth, do not
significantly affect their happiness (unless they render the victim
impecunious),40 6 whereas violent assaults and sexual offenses, which can
infringe individuals' sense of security, affect their health, and impede
their capacity to live freely and autonomously, exact a far greater toll on
their victims' well-being.4 07
Once the effect of an offense on a victim has been assessed, it is
relatively straightforward to determine a sanction that has an equivalent
impact on an offender's well-being by inflicting a similar degree of
suffering or inconvenience on him or her.408 Of the available sanctions
(with the exception of capital punishment), imprisonment has the most
severe impact on offenders' well-being, though its effects are commonly
underrated.4 09 Applying the proportionality principle, prison terms would
therefore be reserved for the most serious violent and sexual crimes,
which would result in a near halving of prison numbers.4 10
404.

Id. These measures are designed to be more informative than economic statistics. See id.

405. Id. These measures are consistent with various studies of human well-being. See Michael
Argyle et al., Happinessas a Function ofPersonalityand Social Encounters, in RECENT ADVANCES
IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 189, 193-94 (Joseph P. Forgas & J.

Michael Innes eds., 1989) (discussing the different components of happiness); see also TIM
KASSER, THE HIGH PRICE OF MATERIALISM 5-9, 64-66, 88-92 (2002); DAVID G. MYERS, THE
PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS (1992); MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN, AUTHENTIC HAPPINESS: USING THE NEW
POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY TO REALIZE YOUR POTENTIAL FOR LASTING FULFILLMENT 10-12, 14, 4950, 55-56, 58, 116-18, 128-29 (2002); Martin E. P. Seligman & Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Positive
Psychology: An Introduction, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 5, 9-12 (2000). For a summary of the results
of these studies see Mirko Bagaric & James McConvill, Goodbye Justice, Hello Happiness:
Welcoming PositivePsychology to the Law, 10 DEAKIN L. REV. 1, 8-20 (2005).
406. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, Money Can't Buy Happiness: Individualism a Stronger
Predictorof Well-Being Than Wealth, Says New Study (June 14, 2011), http://www.apa.org/news/
press/releases/2011/06/buy-happiness.aspx.
407. See Adriaan J.M. Denkers & Frans Willem Winkel, Crime Victims' Well-Being and Fear
in a Prospective and LongitudinalStudy, 5 INT'L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 141, 155-58 (1998); Rochelle
F. Hanson et al., The Impact of Crime Victimization on Quality of Life, 10 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS

189, 190-93 (2010).
408. See RYBERG, supra note 389, at 102-03; ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH,
PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES ch. 9 (2005).
409. See Bagaric & Gopalan, supra note 8, at 185, 204, 216.
410. See id. at 189, 216, 228, 235.
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Thus, in our view, there is a sound doctrinal basis for injecting
content into the proportionality principle to the extent that it can be used
to define tightly the parameters of an appropriate sanction. Moreover,
this would result in a diminution in sanction severity for most offenses.
A universally or widely accepted definition of proportionality would
provide a strong shield to draconian penalties. The intuitive appeal of the
principle would make it difficult to argue in favor of sentences that were
demonstrably, disproportionately harsh.4 11 However, proportionalism
cannot serve as a vehicle for reforming sentencing practice until there is
widespread and pragmatic endorsement of such an approach.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Expert analyses and empirical research regarding sentencing have
focused on the content of sentencing law and exposed various flaws of
the sentencing system. 4 12 They have identified that its key current
failings derive from lawmakers' pursuit of objectives that are largely
unattainable, including incapacitation, marginal general deterrence, and
specific deterrence, which has resulted in the imposition of harsh
sanctions.4 13 Another significant problem has been lawmakers' failure to
distinguish between offenses that significantly harm victims, namely,
serious violent and sexual crimes, and less damaging crimes, such as
property and drug offenses, and to reflect those differences in the
penalties set for crimes.
Notwithstanding this knowledge, fundamental flaws in the
sentencing system remain. This Article examines reasons why
sentencing law is so resistant to evidence-based reform, and has
proposed changes to address these issues and realize a fairer and more
efficient sentencing system.414
This Article argues that the gap between sentencing knowledge and
practice and the consequent mass incarceration crisis is attributable
particularly to the "tough on crime" agenda, which has thrived unabated
given the lack of public empathy or concern for criminals. Such punitive
attitudes to criminal justice have been fueled by racism against minority
groups, especially African Americans, as well as the crime wave from
about 1960 to 1980, considerable economic instability in the past three
decades, and the privatization of aspects of criminal justice policy and

411.
412.
413.
414.

See Bagaric, supra note 402, at 414-15, 417-18.
See supraParts II, IV.
See supra Parts II.B, IV.A-B.
See supra Part VI.
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practice and, in particular, the establishment of private prisons. 4 15 The
vacuous nature of the proportionality principle has also led to failings in
the current sentencing system and the imposition of unduly severe
sanctions. In theory, this principle could profoundly influence the type
and severity of sanctions, but its lack of content has deprived scholars of
an important counter-argument to the imposition of increasingly harsh
penalties over the past few decades.
There is, however, now some prospect of meaningful sentencing
reform owing to a growing awareness in American society that the
prison population is so large that it is becoming too expensive to
accommodate.416 To take advantage of current receptiveness to change
and effect evidence-based sentencing reform, this Article maintains that
it is vital to take a multi-pronged, systematic, and strategic approach.
This will involve not only highlighting deficiencies in sentencing law
and practice, but also injecting content into the proportionality principle
and understanding and overcoming, or at least diluting, the bases and
impact of punitive attitudes to criminal justice. 417
To this end, we suggest that the impact of race on sentencing must
be accepted and immediate measures implemented to reduce the
disproportionate penal burden imposed on African Americans. Such
measures include introducing a sentencing discount for African
American offenders, reducing the emphasis on prior convictions, and
changing policing and prosecution practices that disproportionately
In addition, it is critical to acknowledge
target African Americans.
that the crime rate has dropped dramatically in the last thirty years and
that bringing more individuals within the scope of the criminal justice
system and increasing prison numbers will impede the long-term
economic and social flourishing of the United States. Further, it will be
necessary to discourage the use of private prisons and undermine the
power of this industry.419 At the heart of all of these reforms lies the
recognition that reforms in the Progressive tradition will not produce the
required changes to criminal justice policies and practices. They will not
address the determinative role of racial prejudice or bias in criminal
justice. Nor will they address the economic, political, and especially the
moral problems created by privatization of prison operations.
Pursuing these recommendations will, however, make possible and
more effective evidence-based reforms to the sentencing system,
415. See supra Part VI.A.
416. See supra Part HA.
417.

See supra Part VI.B.

418. See supra Part VI.A.1.
419. See supra Part VIA.5.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

65

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 5

850

HOFSTRA IAWREVIEW

[Vol. 45:785

including those discussed in this Article, such as the introduction of a
bifurcated system whereby only serious violent and sexual offenders are
imprisoned. 4 20 These reforms will considerably reduce the incarceration
rate without diminishing community safety and save the community
billions of dollars.

420. See supra Parts IV.C, VI.A.1, VI.B.
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